THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE 1991-1992 TERM by Mincberg, Elliot M.
NYLS Journal of Human Rights 
Volume 10 
Issue 1 VOLUME X FALL 1992 PART ONE Article 2 
1992 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE 
1991-1992 TERM 
Elliot M. Mincberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Supreme Court of the 
United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mincberg, Elliot M. (1992) "THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE 1991-1992 TERM," 
NYLS Journal of Human Rights: Vol. 10 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol10/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Journal of Human Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
© Copyright 1992 by New York Law School
VOLUME X FALL 1992 PART ONE
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE 1991-1992 TERM
Elliot M. Mincberg*
In many respects, the 1991-1992 Term of the Supreme Court
was the term that wasn't. Despite the urgings of the Bush Justice
Department and many others, it wasn't the Term that the Court
expressly overruled Roe v. Wade.' Despite arguments from many of
the same sources, it wasn't the Term that the Court overruled Lemon
v. Kurtzman2 on church-state separation. Headlines and pundits
expressed relief, and some surprise, at the results of many of the
Court's decisions.
It is important, however, to look behind the headlines and
carefully scrutinize the Court's rulings and their implications. With
respect to the First Amendment, for example, the headlines are
Legal Director, People For the American Way, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1974,
Northwestern University; J.D. 1977, Harvard University. The author and People For
the American Way gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Yael Levy and Dulce
Donovan, summer legal interns at People For the American Way, without whose work
this article would not have been possible.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
See, e.g., Justices Decline to Rewrite Church-State Separation Rules, 20 SCH.
LAW NEws, July 3, 1992, at 1.
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correct in proclaiming that well-publicized cases like Lee v. Weisman4
on prayer in schools and R.A. V. v. St. Paul 5 on hate speech laws
have produced important decisions preserving First Amendment
freedoms. But in cases that did not make headlines, the Court eroded
free speech protections or came dangerously close to doing so. And
even cases like Weisman and R.A. V. raise troubling questions about
the future of First Amendment jurisprudence.
Most of the Court's First Amendment decisions in the 1991-
1992 Term concerned freedom of speech. What was most clear in
these rulings was the Court's antipathy towards content-based
restrictions on expression. Not a single vote was cast on the Court
in favor of the "Son of Sam" law struck down in Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd.6 or the
anti-cross-burning ordinance overruled in R.A. V., even though both
provisions had been upheld by the lower courts.
In other rulings concerning free speech, however, the results
were mixed. In cases concerning restrictions on expression in public
forums and election laws restraining speech, the Court upheld a ban
on solicitation in a public airport terminal,7 sanctioned a prohibition
against political speech near polling places on election day,8 and
approved a state law forbidding voters from casting write-in ballots. 9
Decisions protecting First Amendment rights in these contexts were
invariably split, often by very narrow margins. 10
Jurisprudentially, the Court was even more divided, often
4 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (ruling that government-sponsored prayer at public school
graduation ceremony in Providence, Rhode Island was unconstitutional).
1 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating St. Paul ordinance prohibiting cross-burning
and related "hate-crime" behavior).
6 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (striking down New York law requiring forfeiture of
proceeds of books or other works describing the crime by persons accused or convicted
of crime).
' International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992).
Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
9 Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
o See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct.
2709 (1992) (5-4 decision invalidating rule forbidding distribution of literature at
municipal airport); Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395
(1992) (5-4 decision striking down municipal ordinance concerning permit and assembly
fees).
[Vol. X
1992] FIRST AMENDMENT 3
with troubling consequences. The Court's unanimity in striking down
the St. Paul cross-burning ordinance evaporated as to the proper
rationale for the decision, and several justices explained that the
majority's rationale threatened to undermine First Amendment
protections in the long run.1 In upholding restrictions on election
day political activity near polling places, the Court employed a
diluted version of "strict scrutiny" analysis which conflicted with
several other decisions this Term and could erode First Amendment
safeguards in the future. 2 The majority in International Soc'y For
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee [hereinafter ISKCON] weakened
free speech protections in public places through its interpretation of
"public forum" doctrine.13 Concurring and dissenting opinions in
several decisions, which did not garner support from a majority,
would have weakened such protections even further.14 While several
of the Court's free speech decisions this Term were quite positive and
important, and Justice Kennedy in particular demonstrated genuine
sensitivity to First Amendment concerns, the overall effect on free
speech protections was decidedly mixed.
Justice Kennedy also played an important role in the Court's
Establishment Clause decision in Lee v. Weisman"5 this Term, writing
a five to four opinion for the Court which declined to reconsider
Lemon v. Kurtzman16 and which ruled that government-sponsored
prayer at public school graduations was unconstitutional. Yet the
opinions in Weisman and elsewhere suggest that a majority of the
Court may well be prepared to limit or overrule Lemon in another
context. 17  While Weisman clearly disappointed those who have
sought to weaken church-state separation, the future of Establishment
Clause protection remains uncertain.
The remainder of this article will analyze in greater detail
"See discussion of R.A. V., infra pp. 10-20.
12 See infra pp. 10-20; see also discussion of Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846
(1992) and Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992), infra pp. 35-46.
" See discussion of ISKCON, infra pp. 24-34.
14 See id; see also discussion of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Norman, infra
pp. 38-39.
" 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
16 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra note 390.
"7 See discussion of Weisman, infra pp. 56-65.
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each of the Supreme Court's nine First Amendment decisions during
the 1991-1992 Term. These rulings fall into three categories: free
expression, freedom of association, and separation of church and
state.
L Freedom of Speech
A. Content-Based Restrictions on Speech
1. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board
The Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of New
York's "Son of Sam" law18 under the First Amendment in Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd.19
That law provided, inter alia, that an "entity" contracting with a
person "accused or convicted of a crime" for the production of a
book or other work describing the crime must turn over to New
York's Crime Victims Compensation Board any money owed to that
person under the contract.2" Under the law, the Board was required
to deposit the money in an escrow account to be held "for the benefit
of and payable to any victim" of a crime by such person, provided
that the victim brought a civil tort action and recovered a portion of
that money within five years of the date of the establishment of the
account.21 If after five years no actions were pending, the remainder
of the funds in the account could be paid over to the accused criminal
or his legal representatives. 22
The law defined "person convicted of a crime" to include, in
addition to individuals actually found guilty in court, "any person
who has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a
crime for which such person is not prosecuted. ",23 This definition
8 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
'9 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
20 N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
21 Id.
I ld. § 632-a(4).
Id. § 632-a(10)(b).
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effectively rendered the statute applicable to any person who had not
formally been accused or convicted of a crime, yet who admitted, in
a book or other piece of literature, to having committed a crime.'
The case arose when the New York State Crime Victims
Board learned that Simon & Schuster had signed a contract with
organized crime figure Henry Hill and author Nicholas Pileggi for the
production and publication of a book about Hill's life and had already
paid Hill's literary agent a substantial sum of money on Hill's
behalf. 25 The Board notified Simon & Schuster that it had violated
Section 632-a of the Son of Sam law by neglecting to deposit the
money owed Hill in an escrow account for the victims of Hill's
crimes and demanded that both Hill and Simon & Schuster relinquish
to it all money already paid to or that would eventually become
payable to Hill.26 In response, Simon & Schuster sued the Board
under 42 U.S.C. Section 198327 on the grounds that the Son of Sam
law violated the First Amendment and sought an injunction
prohibiting its enforcement. 28 Both the District Court2 9 and the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit 0 upheld the law as consistent with
the First Amendment.
' Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 505. The New York Court of Appeals had
previously ruled that the statute did not cover victimless crimes. Id. The court reasoned
that a victim was "a necessary requirement for implementation of the statute .... "
Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1991), vacated,
112 S. Ct. 859 (1992).
' Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 506-07.
26 Id. at 507.
2 Id.
n Id.
29 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd.,
724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd sub noma. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti,
916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1992) (holding that Son of Sam law
did not violate First Amendment because it did not directly affect expressive activity and
any incidental restriction on expression was no greater than necessary to achieve State's
interest in compensating crime victims).
-o Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'dsub nora.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501 (1992) (affirming that Son of Sam law did not violate First Amendment because,
although statute was content-based restriction on speech, it was narrowly tailored to
serve state's strong interest in preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes until
their victims were fully compensated for all injuries resulting from their victimization).
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The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and found that the
Son of Sam law violated the First Amendment.31 In an opinion
written by Justice O'Connor and joined by five other justices, 2 the
Court held that the statute imposed a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech, something which is
"presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment." '" The
majority noted that regardless of whether the speaker was deemed to
be Hill, whose speech about his past crimes would have been deterred
by the penalty of lost income, or Simon & Schuster, whose
publications would have been limited to books about criminals who
were willing to forgo compensation for at least five years, the statute
undeniably placed a financial disincentive only on speech of a certain
content. 
3 4
The Court explained that the Son of Sam law was
indistinguishable from a tax, such as the one in Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland," which deters speech on the basis of
content, in that both act as financial disincentives on speech. 6 Such
discriminatory financial treatment is subject to heightened scrutiny
under the First Amendment, the Court noted, even when the
legislature had no intent to suppress certain ideas when it enacted the
statute." The Court also made clear that the law's imposition of a
burden on any "entity" contracting with a criminal for the purpose of
conveying his speech is just as much of a violation of the First
Amendment as a law which imposes such a burden on the media,
31 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 507-08. Justice Thomas took no part in the
opinion. Id. at 504.
32 Justices Blackmun and Kennedy, writing separately, concurred in the judgment.
Id. at 512.
33 Id. at 508. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443-44 (1991) (tax
which discriminates on the basis of content of taxpayer speech triggers heightened
scrutiny under First Amendment); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 230 (1987) (sales tax which taxed general interest magazines but exempted
newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sports journals violated First
Amendment's freedom of press guarantee because it discriminated on basis of
publications' content).
' Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
11 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
3 Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508-09.
3 Id. at 509.
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since "[t]he Government's power to impose content-based financial
disincentives on speech surely does not vary with the identity of the
speaker."3" As a result, the Court determined that for the statute to
pass constitutional muster, New York was required to demonstrate
that it was necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it
was a narrowly tailored means to that end.3 9
Although the Court conceded that New York had a compelling
interest in making certain that crime victims were compensated by
those who perpetrated the crimes against them,4" and that criminals
did not obtain financial benefit from their crimes,41 it held that the
State had a minimal interest in limiting crime victim compensation to
money earned by criminals through speech about their crimes.42 The
majority emphasized that New York had no greater interest in
compensating crime victims from these assets of criminals than from
assets obtained through non-speech activities, and that it had no
greater interest in suppressing "storytelling"-related speech of
criminals than any other such speech.43 The Court concluded that the
Son of Sam law's disparate treatment of storytelling criminal speech
was completely unrelated to New York's compelling interest in
ensuring that crime victims were compensated from the fruits of the
crimes committed against them," and that any interest the State might
Id.
3 Id. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987).
4o Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509.
4' Id. at 510.
42 Id.
43 Id.
" The Court stated that the New York Crime Victims' Board had used circular
reasoning in attempting to justify the Son of Sam law by claiming that the State's interest
in upholding the statute was the compensation of crime victims from the profits derived
from criminals' storytelling when, in fact, that was merely the statute's effect. Simon
& Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510. For cases where the Court drew similar conclusions, see
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586
(1983) (holding that State's compelling interest in raising revenue through taxation did
not justify selective taxation of the press since such interest was altogether unrelated to
any distinction between press and nonpress); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467-69
(1980) (holding that State's compelling interest in preserving privacy by banning
residential picketing did not justify selective ban on nonlabor picketing since such
interest was completely unrelated to any distinction between labor and nonlabor
activities).
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have had in imposing such a content-based disincentive on speech was
not compelling.4"
The Court also held that the Son of Sam law did not satisfy
the "narrowly-tailored" requirement of the strict scrutiny test. 46 It
found the statute to be an overbroad means of assuring that victims
are compensated from the fruits of crimes perpetrated against them
for two reasons. 7 First, the statute covered literary works on any
subject so long as they, in some manner, related to the criminal's
description of his crime.48 Second, the statute's definition of "person
convicted of a crime" as including any person who has admitted to
committing a crime permitted New York's Crime Victims Board to
escrow the income of persons who had never even been prosecuted.4 9
Consequently, the statute could have been applied to a wide range of
literary works that did not truly allow "criminals" to profit from their
crimes while leaving victims uncompensated. s
Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court's holding in an
expansive opinion in which he argued that it was superfluous to
subject the statute to strict scrutiny.5" He contended that since the
statute was clearly content-based, and since the content which the
statute regulated was completely protected by the First Amendment,
the statute should have been held per se unconstitutional.5 2
Justice Kennedy maintained that the compelling state interest
test originated in equal protection analysis and has no application in
the realm of content-based regulations which infringe upon free
speech." This, he reasoned, is because subjecting content-based
's Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510-11.
46 Id. at 512.
4 Id. at 511.
a Id.
49 id.
" Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511. Examples of such works include The
Autobiography of Malcolm X, which relates crimes committed by Malcolm X before he
became a public figure; Civil Disobedience, which describes Henry Thoreau's
withholding of taxes and his subsequent time in prison; and even the Confessions of Saint
Augustine, which describes the author's theft of pears from another's vineyard. Id.
" Id. at 512 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52 Id.
" Id. at 513 ("Mhe Court appears to have adopted this formulation in First
Amendment cases by accident rather than as the result of a considered judgment.").
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speech restrictions to that test might wrongly imply "that States may
censor speech whenever they believe there is a compelling
justification for doing so."'  Supreme Court precedent has
demonstrated that the government never has the power to restrict
protected expression because of its content, Justice Kennedy
maintained.55 Thus, he concluded, a strict scrutiny analysis of
content-based regulations such as the Son of Sam law is not only
unnecessary but also unwise.5"
The Court's decision to strike down the Son of Sam law as
incompatible with the First Amendment is consistent with past First
Amendment precedent and with the clear hostility of even
conservative justices on the Rehnquist Court towards explicit content-
based infringements of freedom of expression. 57  As Justice
Kennedy's concurrence demonstrated, however, the Court's majority
may ironically be weakening First Amendment protection against
content regulation in some respects even as it strikes down a content-
based statute. 5' By stating that even content-based regulation may be
permissible in some circumstances, the majority may unintentionally
be inviting future regulation where government believes it has a
S4 id.
" Id. at 514. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers'Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
229-30 (1987); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,648-49 (1984) (content-based discrimination "cannot
be tolerated under the First Amendment"). Justice Kennedy also acknowledged that
there are, however, a number of categories of expression which traditionally have not
received full First Amendment protection and which (at least until the Court's opinion
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)) could be regulated on the basis
of content. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 514 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
m Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 514-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun also filed a concurring opinion which added that the Son of Sam law was
underinclusive as well as overinclusive. Id. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He
stressed that this was important because of the Court's obligation to provide as much
guidance as possible to states with similar statutes. Id.
5' See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) (invalidating
federal law prohibiting flag burning) in which Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined;
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking down local hate crimes
ordinance as facially invalid under First Amendment on grounds that it banned lawful
speech on the basis of content) in which Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, joined
by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, and in which Justice O'Connor wrote a
concurring opinion.
u Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 515.
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sufficiently compelling purpose.
2. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul
Probably the most controversial free speech decision handed
down by the Supreme Court this past term was R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul.9 In a decision that divided civil rights and civil liberties
groups across the nation, the Court struck down a Minnesota hate
crimes ordinance as facially invalid under the First Amendment.'
The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance prohibited the display
of any symbol "including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender .... 61
In the early morning of June 21, 1990, petitioner R.A.V.
burned a cross on the lawn of a black family's house.62 He was
charged with violation of the hate crimes ordinance and moved to
dismiss the charge on the grounds that the ordinance was overbroad
and content-based, rendering it facially violative of the First
Amendment.63 The trial court granted petitioner's motion but the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed." The state court explained that,
although the ordinance's language was overbroad on its face, the
prohibition should be construed under state law to cover only
incitement to imminent lawless activity and "fighting words," 61
categories of expression which have not received protection under the
59 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
'3Id. at 2547.
61 ST. PAUL, MINN. LEOiS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
' R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
'6 Id. Petitioner was also charged with violation of MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(4)
(Supp. 1990), prohibiting racially motivated assaults, but did not contest that charge.
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 n.2.
" In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
' The Minnesota Supreme Court defined fighting words as "those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." In re
Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991) (citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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First Amendment." The Minnesota court also held that the ordinance
was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government interest of
"protecting the community against bias-motivated threats to public
safety and order." 7
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and declared the
ordinance unconstitutional.6 ' While agreeing on the result, the Court
was sharply divided on the rationale. Justice Scalia wrote the
majority opinion, joined by four other justices, 9 which declared the
ordinance facially unconstitutional on the grounds that it banned
lawful speech based on its content.7" While acknowledging that
certain categories of speech, including defamation,71 obscenity72 and
"fighting words, 3 may be regulated or prohibited altogether because
of their content, the majority maintained that particular types of
speech falling within these categories may not, consistent with the
First Amendment, be regulated based on content or the viewpoint
they express.74 Even assuming the ordinance was limited to "fighting
words," the majority explained, it improperly discriminated based on
content because it only prohibited "fighting words" addressed to
"R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 511).
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541-42 (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at
511).
68 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
6 Justice Scalia's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Id. at 2541.
Id. at 2547. The majority struck down the ordinance in spite of its acceptance of
the Minnesota Supreme Court's narrowing construction which held that the ordinance
covered only "fighting words" as defined by Chaplinsky and incitement to imminent
lawless action. Id.
" See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that
individuals may be compensated for harm inflicted upon them by defamatory falsehood
because false statements of fact have no constitutional value); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that public official may recover damages for
defamatory falsehood if s/he proves that statement was made with actual malice).
7 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that a work may be
subject to state regulation if it appeals to the prurient interest in sex, portrays in a
patently offensive way sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,
and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that
"fighting words" may be regulated because they constitute "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas").
'" R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992).
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"specified disfavored topics" such as race and religion and did not,
for example, forbid "fighting words" used to express hostility based
on "political affiliation" or "union membership. "I
The majority suggested that the ordinance further
discriminated against speech on the basis of its viewpoint since, for
example, it permitted the use of "fighting words" that did not express
hostility on the basis of race or religion by individuals arguing in
favor of tolerance and equality, but not "fighting words" by those
arguing against those tenets.76 St. Paul's object of conveying to
minority groups its disapproval of speech expressing group hatred,
the Court held, did not justify its selective ban on speech on the basis
of its content.77
The majority acknowledged that there were exceptions or
limitations to its rule against content-based regulation of "fighting
words" or other traditionally unprotected expression, but held that the
St. Paul ordinance did not fall within any of these exceptions. 78 It
maintained that the restrictions imposed by the ordinance were not
directed at the aspect of the fighting words that rendered them
proscribable since fighting words are proscribable because "their
content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary)
mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey," and
the ordinance prohibited fighting words because of the particular idea
(of racial, gender, or religious intolerance) that their content
communicated. 79 Furthermore, the ordinance could not be saved on
the grounds that it was aimed at the "secondary effects" of the speech
it proscribed" since its intent, and primary effect, was to protect
71 Id. at 2547.
76 Id. at 2547-48.
n Id. at 2548.
7 Id.
79 R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549. According to the majority, this exception does
justify, for example, the federal law prohibiting threats of violence against the President,
since the reasons why threats are outside the protection of the First Amendment "have
special force when applied to the person of the President." Id. at 2546.
o See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding against
First Amendment challenge city ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters
from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple-family
dwelling, church, park, or school, on grounds that the city's concern with the secondary
effects of adult theaters on the surrounding community is a substantial government
1992] FIRST AMENDMENT 13
victims of hate crimes from hearing bias-motivated speech.8" The
majority suggested that content-based restrictions. may be permissible
under circumstances where they do not threaten the suppression of
ideas, but held that the ordinance did not qualify for that exception. 2
Finally, the Court held that the ordinance could not be justified on the
ground that it was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state
interest of protecting the basic human rights of groups who .have
historically been subject to discrimination, since an ordinance written
more broadly to include groups other than those enumerated by St.
Paul would have accomplished the same goal.83
Justice White wrote a concurring opinion which Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor joined and which Justice Stevens joined in
part." Justice White agreed with the majority's judgment but
vehemently contested its reasoning.85 He lambasted the majority for
failing to test the St. Paul ordinance under the traditional standards
of First Amendment jurisprudence.86
Like the majority, Justice White noted that certain categories
of speech, including fighting words, may be regulated on the basis of
content. 87 However, he argued that these categories of speech are
proscribable because they have slight social value 8 and that the
Court's protection of fighting words in its holding ignores that well-
established doctrine. 9  Unlike the traditional overbreadth doctrine
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression which renders the ordinance
content-neutral).
" R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549. The impact of expression on its listeners, the
majority explained, is not the type of "secondary effect" referred to in Renton. See Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
' R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
83 Id. at 2549-50.
8 Id. at 2550.
5 Id.
Id. at 2550-51.
8 Id. at 2551 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) ("the unconditional phrasing
of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance").
"9 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that "[i]t is
inconsistent to hold that the government may. proscribe an entire category of speech
because the content of that speech is evil, but that the government may not treat a subset
of that category differently without violating the First Amendment") (citation omitted).
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which ensures that protected expression will not be chilled, 90 Justice
White charged the Court's new "underbreadth" doctrine encourages
expression which is valueless and even harmful by First Amendment
standards.9" Additionally, Justice White contended that the Court's
holding failed to distinguish between unprotected speech, which is
proscribable on the basis of content because it has de minimis social
value, and protected speech, which may be restricted only if the
government advances a compelling interest and uses narrowly tailored
means of regulation.92
Justice White also maintained that the majority failed to apply
strict scrutiny to the ordinance in R.A. V. in a manner consistent with
numerous previous holdings,93 including the Court's recent decision
in Burson v. Freeman.' In Burson, the Court upheld a ban on
certain political speech near polling places on election day, explicitly
rejecting an "underbreadth" attack, and ruling that the ban need not
have been enacted in broader, content-neutral terms. 9 This was
flatly inconsistent with the majority in R.A. V., Justice White
maintained, which held that a law must ban either an entire class of
speech or no speech at all."
Justice White also attacked the majority's "ad hoc exceptions"
to its "radical revision of First Amendment law. "' For example, he
pointed out that the majority's suggestion that content-based
distinctions may be drawn within an unprotected category of speech
90 See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990); Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772
(1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
91 R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring). Justice White warned that the
majority's holding will have a detrimental effect on First Amendmentjurisprudence since
it will be taken as a message that hate speech has sufficient value to outweigh the social
interest in order and morality that has rendered such speech less deserving of First
Amendment protection. Id.
9 Id. at 2554.
9 Id.
94 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992). See infra pp. 40-46.
'" R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2555 (White, J., concurring) (citing Burson, 112 S. Ct. at
1850). See Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1856. ("The First Amendment does not require States
to regulate for problems that do not exist.").
9' R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2555 (White, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 2556.
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if the restriction is directed at the very reason that the speech is
proscribable is really an "exception that swallows the majority's
rule." 9' While this exception makes it proper to ban threats against
the President, since "'the reasons why threats of violence are outside
the First Amendment . . . have special force when applied to the
person of the President,"' Justice White explained, precisely the same
rationale would apply to the St. Paul ordinance, since "'the reasons
why [fighting words] are outside the First Amendment . . . have
special force when applied to [groups that have historically been
subjected to discrimination]."' 99
Although Justice White clearly suggested that a properly
drafted rule banning racially or religiously-based "fighting words"
would be constitutional, he concluded that the St. Paul ordinance was
improper because it was overbroad.1" He explained that, while
criminalizing some unprotected expression, the ordinance also
criminalized a large amount of expression that is protected by the
First Amendment.101 Although Justice White agreed that the
Minnesota Supreme Court's narrowing construction of the ordinance
must be considered in determining whether the ordinance passes
constitutional muster, he determined that the state court included
within the definition of "fighting words" any "expression that 'by its
very utterance' causes 'anger, alarm or resentment.'""12 However,
Justice White explained, fighting words jurisprudence has consistently
affirmed that the mere fact that expression causes offense, injury, or
resentment does not render it unprotected. °3 Even as construed by
9 Id.
Id. (quoting majority opinion at 2545-46). Similarly, Justice White maintained,
the "secondary effects" exception by the majority was questionable, and any rationale
that would make sex harassment a "secondary effect" of speech subject to regulation
under Title VII could apply to a St. Paul-type ordinance. Id. at 2557.
'0 id. at 2559-60.
101 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring).
" Id. (construing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991)).
'0' R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring). See, e.g., United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409, 414 (1989);
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (plurality opinion); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
105, 107-08 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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the Minnesota high court, therefore, the ordinance was fatally
overbroad. "'
In a separate concurrence joined in part by Justices White and
Blackmun, Justice Stevens similarly admonished the Court for
revising the categorical approach to First Amendment analysis, and
for crafting new and inconsistent exceptions to its new rule. 0 5 As a
result of the majority's holding, Justice Stevens noted, the Court
ironically accorded fighting words at least the same protection as
political speech and even greater protection than commercial speech,
which may be harmful to the First Amendment in the long run.l'0
Justice Stevens went on to explain that, like the majority, he
also had reservations about the categorical approach to First
Amendment analysis discussed by Justice White in his concurrence.117
According to Justice Stevens, such analysis failed to recognize that
the lines dividing the categories are obscure and constantly changing,
and fails to. consider the context in which the speech is made,
something that has great bearing on the degree of protection it
merits.10 8  Justice Stevens asserted that First Amendment
jurisprudence has established a far broader and more sophisticated
approach to analyzing the validity of laws restricting expression and
the level of protection accorded certain expression.1°9 He stated that
a number of factors must be considered in such analysis, including
'0o R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring).
"05 Id. at 2560 (Stevens, J., concurring).
06 Id. at 2562. This point was made more explicitly by Justice Blackmun in his
brief concurrence, in which he charged that by holding that all expressive activity merits
the same degree of First Amendment protection, the Court actually reduced the total
amount of protection for such activities since the realities are that the Court will never
accord some categories of expression, such as child pornography and cigarette
advertising, the same level of protection it accords others, such as political speech.
Justice Blackmun stated that the case might be regarded as an aberration in First
Amendment jurisprudence and have no precedential value since, rather than applying
well-established standards of analysis, the Court "manipulated doctrine to strike down
an ordinance whose premise it opposed." Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
o R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 2566-67.
'"9 Id. at 2567.
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the content and character of the speech,110 the context in which the
speech is made,"' the nature of the law restricting the speech,"' and
the scope of the restriction."'
Applying his analysis to the St. Paul ordinance, and assuming
that the ordinance regulated only fighting words and was not
overbroad, Justice Stevens concluded that the ordinance was
constitutional. 14 With regard to the content and character of the
regulated expression, Justice Stevens contended that the ordinance
passed constitutional muster because it regulated only low value
speech" 5 and "expressive conduct [rather] than . . . the written or
spoken word. "" 6 Concerning the context of the regulated expression,
110 Compare Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) ("First Amendment
protection is 'at its zenith"' when the government regulates political speech or speech
on matters of public importance) with Pasadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986) ("commercial speech receives a limited form
of First Amendment protection"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70
(1976) ("society's interest in protecting [sexually explicit films] is of a wholly different,
and lesser, magnitude than [its] interest in untrammeled political debate").
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) ("[a]ny
assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made in the
context of its labor relations setting ... [and] must take into account the economic
dependence of the employees on their employers").
112 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable"); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[v]iewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest
form"); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("[any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity").
3 R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2569 (Stevens, J., concurring). See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (emphasizing that scope of ruling which
restricted times that offensive words could be broadcast was narrowly limited); Young
v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (finding significant that "what [was]
ultimately at stake [was] nothing more than a limitation on the place where adult films
may be exhibited").
14 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"5 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting words
constitute "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality").
16 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2569 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)).
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Justice Stevens found it noteworthy that the ordinance only regulated
fighting words, words which are partially determined by their context
since they must be "directed at individuals" and spoken "in
confrontational and potentially violent situations. "117 The nature of
the St. Paul ordinance further strengthens its validity, Justice Stevens
argued, since the ordinance regulated expression on the basis of the
harm it produces and not on the basis of subject matter or
viewpoint."' He contended that the ordinance did not regulate a
subcategory of expression which involved discussions concerning
race, color, creed, religion, or gender; rather, it regulated only a
subcategory of expression that causes harm based on those traits." 9
Furthermore, Justice Stevens maintained, even if the
ordinance regulated fighting words based on their subject matter it
would still be constitutional because some subject matter regulations
are valid and even necessary in our society and because the ordinance
did not go so far as to regulate on the basis of viewpoint, a far
greater transgression of the First Amendment. 2 ' Finally, the St. Paul
ordinance, according to Justice Stevens, had a very narrow scope
since it only banned a subcategory of an already narrow category of
fighting words, thereby permitting a large variety of other expression
about race, religious, and gender equality."2 Thus, Justice Stevens
concluded, had the ordinance not been overbroad he would have
voted to uphold it as a valid content-based regulation of speech. 122
In some respects, R.A. V. is clearly a victory for the First
Amendment. All nine justices agreed that the St. Paul ordinance was
unconstitutional, and all nine reinforced the clear message sent by
Simon & Schuster v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Bd. 12 that content or viewpoint-based regulation of private speech
generally will not pass constitutional muster. Education officials have
already commented that R.A. V. will probably lead state colleges and
"i R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2659 (Stevens, J., concurring).
I Id. at 2570.
119 Id.
' Id. at 2570-71. Justice Stevens maintained that the ordinance was not viewpoint-
based because it barred both sides from using the designated hate speech. Id.
121 Id. at 2571.
I2 d.
'z 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991); see discussion of Simon & Schuster, supra pp. 4-10.
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universities to review carefully any codes they have adopted
regulating student speech and conduct, and will probably "curtail
what limited interest there was . . . in establishing speech codes. "12"
In other respects, however, Justice Scalia's majority opinion
in R.A.V. raises serious questions for the future of the First
Amendment. By effectively striking down the St. Paul ordinance as
"underbroad," the majority, in some respects, is calling for regulation
of more speech, not less. It is sending a signal to states that if they
wish to restrict a certain type of unprotected expression, they must
restrict the entire category of expression and not just a subcategory
of it. Ironically, this could lead to attempts by government to
regulate more speech, not less.
Furthermore, by elevating the First Amendment protection of
fighting words to the same level as traditional categories such as
political speech, the Court could well erode the protection given free
speech across the board. As Justice Blackmun warned, the Court will
never afford certain types of speech, such as child pornography and
cigarette advertising, the same degree of protection it has previously
accorded speech such as political discourse."Z To the extent that all
these forms of speech must be accorded similar protection under
R.A. V. the result could well be to adopt the lowest common
denominator and weaken free speech protections.
Finally, the new theory articulated by the majority, 26 with its
exceptions and limitations, is bound to cause confusion and difficulty
for the lower courts, as the concurring opinions by Justices White and
Stevens illustrate. According greater protection in some respects to
fighting words and obscenity than to commercial speech, for
example, "turns First Amendment law on its head." '127 As Justice
Blackmun commented, R.A. V. may well be regarded as sui generis
and may not have broad implications for First Amendment
jurisprudence.12 ' At this point, however, the net effect of R.A. V. on
124 Supreme Court's 'Hate Speech Ruling May Curb Campus Codes, 20 ScH. LAW
NEWS, July 3, 1992, at 5 (quoting Sheldon Steinbach, General Counsel for the American
Council on Education).
"' R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
12 See supra pp. 11-13.
7 R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2564 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 2560-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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the future of the First Amendment is uncertain and potentially
troubling in some respects.
B. Restrictions on Speech in Public Forums
1. Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement
In Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement,129 the
Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, struck down a local
ordinance which threatened to restrict speech in public forums.13 °
Forsyth County's Ordinance 343 authorized the county administrator
to issue permits to private individuals wishing to assemble or parade
on public property and to charge them a fee commensurate with the
administrator's determination of the cost necessary to process the
permit applications and to maintain public order at the public
gathering.132 The ordinance set a limit of $1000 per day. 33
In 1989, an organization called "The Nationalist Movement"
applied for a permit to demonstrate on the county courthouse steps in
opposition to the federal holiday commemorating Martin Luther King,
Jr.'s birthday.134 Pursuant to Ordinance 34, the county imposed a
$100 fee for the permit."' The Movement responded by filing suit
and requesting an injunction barring Forsyth County from using the
ordinance to obstruct the rally. 13 6
The District Court denied injunctive relief on the grounds
that, although the ordinance gave the county administrator substantial
discretion in calculating the fee for each permit applicant, the fee was
to be calculated on the basis of content-neutral criteria including the
29 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
ISOd. at 2405.
131 CUMMIN, GA., CrrY PARADE AND ASSEMBLY ORDINANCE § 3(6) & (7) (1987).
132 Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2399.
133 Id.
134 Id.
13 
.
Id.
'" Id. at 2400. The fee was not paid and the rally was cancelled. Id.
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administrative costs of issuing the permit.137 The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that "[a]n
ordinance which charges more than a nominal fee for using public
forums for public issue speech, violates the First Amendment," and
that a fee of up to $1000 per day was far more than a nominal fee.13s
In a decision written by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court
affirmed the holding of the court of appeals, declaring that Ordinance
34 violated the First Amendment on its face.139 The Court found that
the ordinance constituted a prior restraint on speech which did not
satisfy the constitutional criteria for government regulation of the uses
of public forums. 140  It explained that if the government elects to
impose a permit requirement on those wishing to parade or assemble
in a public forum, "[i]t may not delegate overly broad licensing
discretion to a government official" 141 and that the criteria for
obtaining the permit must not be based upon the content of the
assemblers' message, must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and must leave open alternative channels of
communication. 14 2
The Court held that Forsyth County's interpretation and
implementation of the ordinance manifested that the county lacked
"'narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards' guiding the
137 Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2400. The court was troubled by the clause
of the ordinance that permitted the costs of maintaining public order to be assessed
against demonstrators, but it held that the ordinance, as applied to the Movement, was
not an unconstitutional infringement on free expression. Id.
" Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 913 F.2d 885, 891 (11th Cir. 1990),
aft'd, 934 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (quoting Central Florida Nuclear Freeze
Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1523 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120
(1986)). The Court of Appeals subsequently vacated the panel's opinion, reheard the
case en bane, and issued a per curiam opinion reinstating the entire panel opinion.
Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 934 F.2d 1482, 1483 (1991).
"' Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined in the majority opinion.
'40 Id. at 2401.
'1 Id. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965).
142 Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2401 (construing United States v. Grace,' 461
U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).
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hand of the Forsyth County administrator." 43 It found that the
administrator had wide discretion, free from any articulated objective
standards, to determine whether and how much to charge permit
applicants for police protection, and that this discretion allowed him
to assess fees to permit applicants based on his estimation of their
viewpoints, 44
Aside from finding that Ordinance 34 vested excessive
discretion in the county administrator, the Court also held it
unconstitutional on the ground that it was content-based. 14' The
administrator could not possibly calculate how much to charge permit
applicants for security unless he considered the content of their
message, predicted the response of others to that content, and
estimated the quantity of police that would be necessary to contain
that response.'"6 The public's reaction to the assemblers' message,
the Court held, was clearly a content-based criterion for calculating
the fee, rendering the ordinance unconstitutional. 147 As the Court
recognized, "[s]peech cannot be financially burdened, any more than
it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile
" Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2402-03 (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951)). The Court found that the administrator based the fee he
charged the Movement on his subjective determination of what would be reasonable.
Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2403.
', Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2402-03.
' Id. at 2403. The sole justification that Forsyth County offered for the ordinance,
the need to raise revenue for law enforcement services, was found clearly inadequate to
vindicate a content-based fee. Id. at 2404.
" Id. at 2403. The Court also noted that financial disincentives on speech, because
its content may offend a hostile audience, are no more constitutional than outright bans
on such speech. Id. at 2404.
147 Id. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988). The Court distinguished Cox v. New York, 312
U.S. 569, 577 (1941) (upholding a state statute which authorized a municipality to
charge a parade permit fee of up to $300 for processing costs and "maintenance of public
order") on the grounds that no fee was, in fact, assessed in Cox and that Cox did not
authorize the assessment of a permit fee whenever a controversial political message is
delivered before a hostile audience. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2404. As the
Court explained, even though the Forsyth County ordinance contained much of the same
language as the rule in Cox, the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence since Cox
makes clear that it is unconstitutional to effectively charge "a premium in the case of a
controversial message delivered before a hostile audience." Id.
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Finally, the Court rejected Forsyth County's claim that the
$1000 cap on the permit fee would prevent the ordinance from
resulting in content-based discrimination.149 It held that the fee's
amount, even if it was nominal, was irrelevant because the ordinance
was still unconstitutionally content-based in its linkage of the fee
amount to the content of the expression and it provided no procedural
safeguards to cure that infirmity.150
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas joined."' Justice Rehnquist
claimed that the case was governed by Cox v. New Hampshire,152
where a state statute authorizing a municipality to assess a parade
permit fee of up to $300 to meet the administrative costs of
processing the permit applications and maintaining public order at the
licensed activity was upheld.' 53 Although acknowledging that Cox
had been more narrowly interpreted to permit only nominal charges,
the dissent construed Cox as "expressly recogniz[ing] that the New
Hampshire state statute allowed a city to levy much more than a
nominal parade fee . . .. ""4 The dissent further argued that the
"4 Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2404 (footnote omitted). See Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
14' Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2405.
150 The Court stated that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly suggested, based on
its reading of Murdock v. Pennsylvania, that a nominal fee would have been valid. Id.
See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down a municipal
ordinance which authorized assessment of a flat licensing tax on the distribution of
religious literature as infringing the First Amendment right of religious expression).
While distinguishing the fee upheld in Cox, the Murdock Court had noted that the fee
imposed in its case was not nominal, and the Court of Appeals had understood that to
mean that nominal fees were constitutional. Id. at 116. As the majority explained in
Nationalist Movement, the Murdock Court was simply distinguishing the facts there from
those in Cox, and the nominal size of a fee does not necessarily make it proper.
Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2405.
' Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
153 Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2406 (discussing Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941)).
"4 Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2406 (construing and quoting Cox, 312 U.S.
at 576). In particular, Justice Rehnquist claimed that Murdock had mischaracterized the
Cox statute by implying, while distinguishing the case, that the fee it sanctioned was
merely nominal. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2406.
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Court's concern that the county would assess fees on the basis of
approval or disapproval of permit applicants' messages or possible
hostile audiences was unfounded since, Justice Rehnquist explained,
neither the county nor any lower court had ever construed the
ordinance as vesting the county administrator with unchecked
discretion and the lower courts had never found that the county
intended to do that or had ever done so before.1 55
The opinion in Nationalist Movement represents an important
reaffirmation of the principle recognized in Murdock v. Pennsylvania:
"[F]reedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are
available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way.15
In fact, as the majority suggested, a contrary ruling would have
allowed a municipality to seriously limit the ability of controversial
speakers to express their views in public by requiring them to pay
police protection and related costs due to potentially unreceptive or
hostile audiences. While the ordinance in Nationalist Movement
would primarily impact on those who could not afford to pay a $1000
fee, the rationale of the dissent could permit even much larger fees,
effectively making difficult or impossible public expression by many
controversial groups. The fact that the Court was only one vote away
from such a result in Nationalist Movement is potentially disturbing
for the future of First Amendment jurisprudence.
2. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
Another important case decided this term concerning
restrictions on speech in public forums was International Society for
' Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2406. Justice Rehnquist stated that
resolution of the issue of whether the ordinance did vest the county administrator with
too much discretion was best left to the district court. Id. at 2407. See Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795 (1989) (holding that city's narrowing construction
of whether municipal noise regulation vests too much discretion in city officials charged
with enforcing it must be considered in determining whether regulation violates First
Amendment). As the majority pointed out, however, the defenders of the ordinance had
consistently taken the position that it permitted increased fees to be charged for the cost
of police protection from hostile crowds, making a remand unnecessary on this
fundamental point. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. at 2404 n.12.
156 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943).
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Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee [hereinafter ISKCON].157 The
issues in ISKCON were whether a government-operated airport
terminal constituted a public forum for First Amendment purposes
and whether a regulation prohibiting solicitation of funds and
distribution or sale of written materials in the terminal violated the
First Amendment. 158
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which
owns and operates three large airports in the New York metropolitan
area, adopted a regulation prohibiting, among other things, repetitive
"solicitation and receipt of funds" and distribution or sale of literature
within its airport terminals, permitting such solicitation and
distribution only on the sidewalks outside the airport terminals.1 59
The International Society for Krishna Consciousness, a nonprofit
religious organization whose members distribute religious literature
and solicit funds in public places to support their religion, sued for
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 on the
grounds that the regulation deprived them of their First Amendment
rights. 160
The district court determined that the airport terminals were
public forums since they were analogous to public streets, the
archetypal public forums. 6 It then applied strict scrutiny, concluded
that the regulation was not narrowly tailored to support a compelling
state interest, and granted petitioner's motion for summary
judgment. 162 The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part, holding that, in light of United States v. Kokinda,' the airport
terminals were not public forums. 1  It thus subjected the regulation
to a lower level of scrutiny and found that the ban on solicitation was
157 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
Id. at 2703.
159 Id. at 2704.
1 Id. at 2703, 2704.
161 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 721 F. Supp. 572,
577 ($.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.- 1991),
af'd, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) (per curiam).
' International Soc y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 721 F. Supp. at 579.
" 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990) (plurality opinion) (holding that postal sidewalk
constituted government property that was not traditional or designated public forum).
" International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 581-
82 (2d Cir. 1991) aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 2709 (1992) (per curiam).
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reasonable while the ban on distribution was not. 65 Both sides
successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. 1"
In a series of opinions, the Court in effect affirmed the ruling
of the Court of Appeals. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter agreed in a per curiam opinion that the ban on
sale and distribution of literature was unconstitutional.1 67 Justice
O'Connor, however, joined Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, which found that the airport was
not a public forum and that the ban on solicitation was proper. 68
Justice Kennedy concurred, concluding that the solicitation ban was
proper even though the airport should be considered a public
forum. 169
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion affirming the solicitation
ban acknowledged that solicitation is protected speech under the First
Amendment. 7 ' Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
stated, the government is not required to permit all types of speech
on its property."7  Applying the "forum-based" approach for
analyzing government regulation of the use of its property for First
Amendment activities, 72 the Court concluded that airport terminals
165 International Soc for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 925 F.2d. at 582.
'66 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2704.
'67 Id. at 2710.
'6 Id. at 2709.
10 Id. at 2715.
170 Id. See also United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3118 (1990) (citing
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 629 (1980)); Riley v.
National Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788-89 (1988); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
171 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2705. When the government acts as proprietor rather
than lawmaker, it has greater discretion to prohibit expression on its property. Id.
(citing Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3119 (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961))). See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (upholding school district limitation on access to internal mail
system used by district to communicate with teachers and employees); Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding ban on political advertisements in
city-operated transit vehicles).
" Under the "forum-based" approach, regulation of expression on public property
that has traditionally been open to the public for expressive activity ("traditional public
forums") or that has been designated by the government for such activity ("designated
public forums") is subject to strict scrutiny and may only be justified by a narrowly
tailored compelling state interest. Regulation of expression on any other form of
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are nonpublic forums and that the Port Authority's regulation,
therefore, was required to be subjected only to a "reasonableness"
standard of review.173
The majority reasoned that airport terminals are not traditional
public forums because airports have only recently achieved their vast
size and commercial nature and, thus, cannot be said to have
"'immemorially . . . time out of mind' been held in the public trust
and used for purposes of expressive activity."174 It further stated that
airport terminals are not designated public forums because, not only
have terminal operators never intentionally opened them up for
expressive activity, but they have frequently objected to such use."7 '
The majority emphasized that the principal function of airports is
facilitation of efficient air travel, not promotion of free expression.7 6
Having concluded that airport terminals are nonpublic forums,
the majority explained, the Port Authority regulation "need only
satisfy a requirement of reasonableness. "'77 Without explaining
specifically what that requirement means, the majority ruled that the
solicitation ban clearly satisfied it.17 The majority maintained that
solicitation often has a disruptive effect on business because it
requires potential customers to stop, decide whether to contribute,
and then search for money, impeding the flow of traffic in airports
and creating delays which may cause travellers to miss their flights.179
Furthermore, the majority suggested, solicitation may cause duress
if it is aimed at vulnerable travellers, and solicitors may commit fraud
government property must only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. ISKCON, 112 S.
Ct. at 2705 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985)).
ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2706.
,7 Id. (quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
(holding, for the first time, that streets and parks are traditional public forums and may
be freely used by the public for expressive activity)).
' ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2706-07. The majority further rejected the claim that
"transportation nodes" such as airports and rail stations have historically been open for
speech activity, noting that many such "nodes" are private and that regardless of the
proper conclusion with respect to other transportation centers, the history of airports
reinforces the conclusion that they are not public forums. Id.
176 1d. at 2707.
'Id. at 2708.
178 Id.
79 Id. (citing United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3123 (1990)).
1992]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
by concealing their true identity or by shortchanging contributors! °
These concerns are enhanced by the fact that travellers are often on
a tight schedule and, thus, probably will not take the time to complain
to airport authorities.1 ' Particularly since the Port Authority did not
completely restrict solicitation on its airport premises, since it
permitted solicitation activities on the sidewalks outside airport
terminals where the majority of air travellers pass, the majority
concluded that the Port Authority's limitation of solicitation was
reasonable in light of its interest in preventing airport congestion and
maintaining efficient air travel. 1 2
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
Court that airport terminals are not public forums. 8 I She went on to
explain, however, that the reasonableness requirement for restrictions
in non-public government forums is nevertheless a meaningful
protection of free speech, and requires that restrictions must truly be
reasonable and not an intentional suppression of the speaker's
viewpoint.' Justice O'Connor stated that whether a government's
regulation of speech in a nonpublic forum is reasonable must be
determined by examining the forum's essential function and nature."8 5
To be reasonable, a restriction on expression in a nonpublic forum
must serve the government's interest in maintaining the property for,
its designated purpose."" While this issue can be easily resolved in
many cases since most forums are dedicated to only one purpose, she
explained, airports are used for a number of activities, none of which
are any more related to the facilitation of air travel than are
's ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2708.
181 Id.
I2 Id. at 2708-09.
I d. at 2711 (O!Connor, J., concurring).
I ld. at 2713. See Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus,
Inc., 482 U.S..569 (1987) (invalidating a regulation that banned "all First Amendment
activities" in the Los Angeles International Airport without even determining whether
airports were public forums).
'u ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2712. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981).
1" ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2712 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)).
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ISKCON's solicitation and distribution activities.' 87 Thus, Justice
O'Connor averred, the relevant inquiry is whether the Port Authority
regulation is reasonably related to maintaining the airport's multi-
purpose tenor, not to promoting efficient air travel. 88
Justice O'Connor concurred with the Court's judgment that
the Port Authority's regulation of solicitation was reasonable,
explaining that by the nature of solicitation as an activity, it interfered
with the airports' functioning. 8 9 Unlike the ban on solicitation,
however, Justice O'Connor stated that the ban on distribution was
unreasonable and invalid.' 9' She distinguished distribution on the
grounds that it did not require the recipient of the literature to stop
and ponder the contents of a leaflet and, thus, did not impede the
functioning of the airport as a multipurpose forum. 9'
Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion, part of
which Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter joined.'1 Justice
Kennedy agreed with the Court's judgment, but disagreed with its
holding that airport terminals are not public forums.'" He explained
that the Court's determination that terminals are not public forums
effectively allows the government unlimited discretion to restrict
expression on its property by simply articulating a nonspeech-related
purpose for the forum, and inhibits the creation of new public
forums. 94 He stated that a determination of whether property
187 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2713.
188 Id.
18 Id.
1 Id.
191 Id. Justice O'Connor noted that the only possible justification for prohibiting
leafletting was the avoidance of littering, but she discounted this as inadequate to sustain
the ban. Id. at 2714. Justice O'Connor also distinguished the case of Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976), where the Court upheld a regulation banning the distribution of
literature on a military base, another multipurpose forum, without the approval of the
base commander. ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2714. She argued that since the commander
in Greer could only disapprove those publications that he found constituted "'a clear
danger to [military] loyalty, discipline, or morale,"' the regulation in that case was
reasonable, whereas the prohibition on leafletting was absolute and not justified by any
reasons independent of those justifying the ban on solicitation. Id. at 2714 (quoting
Greer, 424 U.S. at 840).
'92 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19 Id.
'1 Id. at 2716.
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constitutes a public forum must be based, not on the government's
pronounced purpose for the property nor on its express designation
of the property for expressive activity, but on "the actual physical
characteristics and uses of the property."195
Justice Kennedy attacked the majority for basing its reasoning
on a fallacious view of precedent and history. He contended that the
principal purpose of most traditional public forums is not necessarily
public discourse; for example, the principal purpose of streets and
sidewalks, quintessential public forums, is to facilitate transportation,
like airports, not to promote public discourse.196 Particularly in this
modern age, a government-owned airport is one of the few public
places where many members of the public have contact with each
other and which is suitable for public discourse, analogous to streets
and sidewalks.197
To ascertain whether public property's physical characteristics
and uses render it a public forum, Justice Kennedy maintained, courts
should consider:
[W]hether the property shares physical similarities
with more traditional public forums, whether the
government has permitted or acquiesced in broad
public access to the property, and whether expressive
activity would tend to interfere in a significant way
with the uses to which the government has, as a
factual matter, dedicated the property.198
In answering the question, he suggested, courts should look at "the
consistency of those uses with expressive activities in general, rather
than the specific sort of speech at issue in the case before it" and "the
availability of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions...
"199
I95 ld. Justice Kennedy maintained that the purpose of the First Amendment is to
limit government power and that the Court's holding that the classification of property
depends on the government's definition of it conflicts with this objective. Id.
I' Id. at 2717.
197 Id.
'" ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2718 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
199 Id.
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Applying these principles to the Port Authority's airport
terminals, Justice Kennedy concluded that the terminals were public
forums. 2" He pointed out that the District Court had found that the
airports, like public streets, were large public thoroughfares full of
people, stores, and commercial activities.20 1 Justice Kennedy also
noted that the general public had unlimited access to the Port
Authority airports, making it all the more important to safeguard free
expression rights in them.20 2 Finally, Justice Kennedy maintained that
there was no reason to believe that any interference with the efficient
operation of the airports could not be alleviated with reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions on expression within them.20 3
After concluding that the airport terminals were public
forums, Justice Kennedy strictly scrutinized the Port Authority
regulation and found that the provision prohibiting leafletting within
the airport terminals was fatally overbroad. 2' He explained that the
provision was not narrowly tailored to serve the Port Authority's
interest in maintaining efficient operation of its airports since the
same goal could be accomplished through narrow regulation of the
time and place of the leaflet distribution and that it did not leave open
alternative channels for communication. 20'
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy found that the provision of the
Port Authority regulation prohibiting "solicitation and receipt of
funds" should be upheld as either a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction or as a regulation directed at the nonspeech
component of expressive conduct.2 6 While conceding that solicitation
is protected by the First Amendment, Justice Kennedy argued that the
Port Authority's regulation was valid in that it was narrowly drafted
to prohibit only repetitive in-person solicitation for the immediate
200 Id. at 2719.
201 Id.
2= Id.
2M Id.
2'4 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2720 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20 Id. Justice Kennedy noted that the leafletting provision of the regulation was so
broad that Justice O'Connor found it invalid even under the reasonableness test
applicable to nonpublic forum analysis. Id.
2m Id. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter did not join in this part of Justice
Kennedy's opinion.
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payment of money. 20 7 As such, it permitted solicitation of funds, but
merely limited the manner in which that solicitation could be
accomplished.2 8 Justice Kennedy claimed that such regulation of
solicitation served a significant government interest since in-person
solicitation for immediate receipt of funds creates a risk of fraud and
duress because the solicitee lacks time for reflection before deciding
whether to make a contribution. 2' Furthermore, he noted that the
rule was content-neutral since its purpose was unrelated to the content
of the speech or the identity of the speaker. 21" Finally, Justice
Kennedy contended that the regulation left open alternative channels
of communication since it permitted all solicitation which did not
request immediate payment of funds such as distributing pre-
addressed envelopes for solicitees to later use to mail in their
donations.211
Justice Souter wrote an opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens, agreeing that the distribution provision of the Port
Authority's regulation should be invalidated, but dissenting from the
holding that the solicitation provision should be upheld.212 Justice
Souter agreed with Justice Kennedy concerning the proper designation
of airports as public forums, but maintained that the solicitation ban
failed to pass the strict scrutiny test because it was not narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest and did not leave
open alternative channels of communication. 1 3
Justice Souter explained that the regulation was not narrowly
tailored to advance the government interest in preventing coercion
27 Id. at 2720-21. Justice Kennedy claimed that for a law to be narrowly tailored,
it need not be the least restrictive or intrusive means of achieving the government's goal.
Id.
"' Id. at 2721.
2N ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2722 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
210 Id. at 2722.
211 Id. at 2722-23. Justice Kennedy distinguished the solicitation ban from the ban
on sale of literature, claiming that the danger of fraud was less with respect to sale of
materials seen by a customer, that a ban on sales which is less narrowly tailored would
leave open fewer alternative channels for communication, and that a ban on sales would
discriminate against those who could not afford to distribute their materials free of
charge. Id.
212 Id. at 2724-25 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213 Id.
FIRST AMENDMENT
since a potential customer could easily walk away from an insistent
solicitor.214 Nor could the regulation be sustained on the grounds that
it prevented fraudulent conduct, he maintained, since there was
almost no evidence that ISKCON was perpetrating any fraud and
since there had been no claims of fraud in the Port Authority since
1981.25 Even if the ban on solicitation advanced a significant
government interest, he stated, it would still fail because the
government could, advance its interests in preventing coercion and
fraud by more narrowly tailored and less intrusive means. 21" Finally,
Justice Souter contended that the solicitation ban was invalid for
failing to leave open alternative channels of communication since the
ban effectively prohibited poorly funded groups from receiving
donations from solicitation.21 7
In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion, joined
by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, arguing that the ban on
leafletting should have been upheld along with the ban on
solicitation.2 8 The Chief Justice maintained that leafletting presented
similar problems of. airport congestion and delay as solicitation. 1 9
Furthermore, he argued, many who accept literature later drop it on
the floor, creating not only a safety hazard, but also, creating more
21 4 Id. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) (holding,
in reference to black boycott of white stores, that "[sipeech does not lose its protected
character.. . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action").
215 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2726 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). More than intent to prevent fraud is necessary to sustain a ban on speech. Id.
See, e.g., Schaumburgv . Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980) ("[tlhe
Village, consistently with the First Amendment, may not label such groups 'fraudulent'
and bar them from .canvassing on the streets and house to house.").
216 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2726 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See, e.g., Schawnberg, 444 U.S. at 637-38 (striking down ban on solicitation on
grounds that Village could advance its interest in preventing fraud by less intrusive
means); Riley v. National Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1,988) (holding
that state must use more narrowly tailored means to cure its fraud problem than
compelling disclosure by professional fundraisers of amount of funds turned over to
charity in previous year).
217 ISKCON, .112 S. Ct. at 2727 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). .
218 Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709,
2710 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 2710.
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work for the airport staff who must later clean its floors.220 To the
extent that prohibiting solicitation was reasonable, the dissent urged,
so was forbidding distribution. 2 1
Several aspects of the ISKCON decision have troubling
implications for First Amendment doctrine. By holding that a
government-owned large metropolitan airport terminal is not a public
forum, the majority threatens the structure and flexibility of public
forum analysis. The majority opinion suggests that, aside from
streets, sidewalks, and parks, nothing may be a public forum unless
the government says it is.2 22 Particularly as streets and sidewalks are
used less and nontraditional public gathering places are used more,
the result may be to give the government enormous authority to limit
the scope of the First Amendment.
Furthermore, by holding that airport terminals are nonpublic
forums and that solicitation within them is proscribable,223 the Court
undermined the principle that solicitation is fully protected by the
First Amendment and created a double standard of First Amendment
protection harming new or indigent groups whose very survival may
depend upon collecting funds as they distribute their literature. Such
discriminatory treatment of groups raises equal protection concerns
and makes the case all the more problematic.
Finally, it is important to note that the Court came within one
vote in ISKCON of banning even distribution of free literature in a
government-owned, public gathering place. With a majority of the
Court on record in favor of severely constricting the scope of public
forum doctrine, the only protection left for free expression in many
public places may be the doctrine that restrictions on speech in such
places should at least be "reasonable." Future decisions will reveal
how secure -- or insecure -- that protection will be.
=mId.
221 Id.
22 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2706.
m3 Id.
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C. Election Laws Limiting First Amendment Activity
1. Norman v. Reed
The Supreme Court considered three cases this term in which
election laws allegedly interfered with the First Amendment freedom
of speech. The first, Norman v. Reed,2' concerned the
constitutionality of Illinois ballot access rules. In Norman, petitioners
were candidates for public office who attempted to establish
throughout Cook County the Harold Washington Party (HWP), a
political party previously established in Chicago, which is located in
Cook County. 2' In order to field candidates for statewide elections,
Illinois law generally required new party organizers to obtain 25,000
nominating signatures.226 The HWP candidates submitted nominating
petitions to run for county-wide elections, elections within the city,
and elections limited to contests within the suburbs.227
The HWP petitioners had 44,000 nominating signatures in
Chicago but only 7800 signatures in the suburbs.22 A number of
voters petitioned the County Electoral Board and objected to
petitioners' use of the HWP name.229 They also claimed that since
petitioners had failed to obtain 25,000 signatures in each of the two
electoral districts within Cook County (Chicago and the suburbs),
Illinois law directed the disqualification of petitioners' entire slate of
candidates.230
The Electoral Board rejected the objection to the use of the
HWP name, but disqualified petitioners' candidates from running for
suburban offices.23' The Cook County Circuit Court affirmed the
ruling on the use of the HWP name, but held that state law prohibited
the petitioners from running any candidates in Cook County and
224 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992).
Id. at 700.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-2 (1989).
27 Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 703.
2n id.
MId.
230 Id.
" Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 704.
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subsequently struck the entire slate of candidates.232 The Illinois
Supreme Court banned petitioners' use of the HWP name and
affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling preventing petitioners from
fielding any candidates in the Cook County elections.233
In a seven to one decision," 4 the Supreme Court'reversed in
part and affirmed in part the Illinois Supreme Court, holding that a
complete ban on petitioners' use of the HWP name and the
disqualification of their candidates from running in any county
elections was unconstitutional.235 Justice Souter wrote the opinion of
the Court, noting that the right of citizens to create and develop
political parties was a constitutional right stemming from the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 26 The Court required that "any severe
restriction .. .be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance. ,,237 In Norman, the Court concluded that the
Illinois Supreme Court's "draconian" construction of Illinois law,
232 Id.
2.3 Id.
' Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at
699.
2 Id. at 706. The Supreme Court had earlier granted a stay from the Illinois
Supreme Court decision, essentially reinstating the opinion of the Electoral Board and
thereby permitting petitioners to run under the HWP name in the Cook County election.
Norman v. Reed, 111 S. Ct. 333 (1990) (mem.). None of the HWP candidates were
elected but a number of them received over five percent of the vote and therefore, will
qualify in all or part of Cook County in the next election as an "established political
party." Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 704. The Court rejected the argument that since the
election was over the controversy was moot, stating that "[e]ven if the issue before us
were limited to petitioners' eligibility to use the Party name on the 1990 ballot, that issue
would be worthy of resolution as 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Id. at
704-05 (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969)).
m Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 705. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-94
(1983) (invalidating Ohio's early filing deadline for independent candidates for office of
President as unconstitutional burden on voting and association rights of supporters and
independent candidates); Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
184 (1979) (striking down as unconstitutional Illinois statute requiring nominating
petitions for new political parties seeking office serving less than the entire state to
contain more than 25,000 signatures); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968)
(holding that an Ohio election law, making it impossible for a new party to be placed on
state ballot to choose electors pledged to particular candidates, violated Equal Protection
Clause).
217 Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 705 (citing Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 184,
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which essentially prohibited new candidates running in one political
subdivision from ever using the name of a political party established
in another, was unnecessary to further the States' asserted interests
in preventing misrepresentation and electoral confusion. 8 Such a
construction, the Court reasoned, would unnecessarily frustrate the
development of small parties.?39
The Court also reversed the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling
that petitioners' failure to obtain 25,000 signatures from the suburbs
disqualified the entire slate of candidates running under the HWP
name.? 0 Although Illinois law required petitioners to obtain 25,000
signatures in each district, the Court held that disqualifying the entire
slate of candidates was not the least restrictive means of furthering
the State's interest in limiting the ballot to parties who have
demonstrated public support."
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on Illinois Bd. of
Elections v. Socialist Workers's Party, 2 in which the Court struck
down an Illinois ballot-access scheme that required party organizers
to obtain more nominating signatures to field candidates in local
elections than in state-wide contests." As the Court noted, the
Illinois Supreme Court's construction of the law in Norman
effectively required petitioners to obtain 50,000 signatures to run any
candidates in Cook County. 2" As a result, based on its holding in
Socialist Worker's Party, the Court concluded that the Illinois
Supreme Court's interpretation of the law was not the least restrictive
means of furthering the State's interest and was therefore
unconstitutional.? 5
2 Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 706.
239 Id. As the Court suggested, the State could simply request candidates to get
formal permission before using an established party's name in order to further its
interests. Id..
20 Id. at 707.
241 Id.
242 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
243 Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 707.
244 Id.
5 Id. As the Court explained, Illinois could have advanced its interest by requiring
a minimum number of signatures in each district, fixing the total no higher than 25,000.
Id. at 708. Additionally, the Court pointed out that there was no distribution of support
requirement for statewide elections and stated that "it requires elusive logic to
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Although the Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme
Court's other holdings in Norman, the Court upheld the ruling which
barred them from running in suburban-only races.u 6 Petitioners
contended that since they had acquired 25,000 signatures in the city
district, that should qualify them to field candidates in all of Cook
County." The Court held that the Illinois ballot access requirement
of 25,000 nominating signatures from each electoral district did not
unduly burden petitioners' right to run for positions in the city district
under the HWP name." "Just as the State may not cite the Party's
failure in the suburbs as reason for disqualifying its candidates in
urban Cook County," the Court stated, "neither may the Party cite its
success in the city district as a sufficient condition for running
candidates in the suburbs. "249
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in Norman in which
he argued that Norman and Socialist Workers involved substantially
different fact patterns and therefore the Court's reliance on Socialist
Workers was misplaced." 0 Justice Scalia maintained that the "sort
of" heightened signature minimum in Norman was the indirect result
of the requirement that a new party run a "complete slate," i.e., a
candidate in each of the subdivision districts. 21  As a result of the
complete slate requirement, no one could run as a new party
candidate in any district unless that new party's candidates in other
districts also received 25,000 signatures.252 Socialist WorkersParty,
Justice Scalia noted, involved a single election for an at large position
demonstrate a serious state interest in demanding such a distribution for new local
parties." Id.
0 Id. at 707-08.
247 Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 708.
24 Id.
9 Id. The Supreme Court declined to consider and remanded for determination one
other issue in the case. The HWP party did not field candidates for any elected judicial
offices in Cook County. The Circuit Court held that this was a failure to fulfill the
Illinois complete-slate requirement and invalidated the party's slate of candidates on that
basis. The Court declined to consider the issue because the Illinois Supreme Court did
not address it. Id. at 708-09.
m Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 710 (Scalia, ., dissenting).
251 id.
252 Id.
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and therefore was not dispositive of the facts in Norman.25
Furthermore, Justice Scalia asserted that the "complete slate
requirement" advanced the State's legitimate interest in ensuring that
candidates have serious support in each election.2 4  Absent a
legitimate constitutional challenge to the complete slate requirement,
Justice Scalia concluded, there was no reason to deny the State the
right to demand that new party candidates acquire 25,000 signatures
from each district within a political subdivision255
The Court's reasoning and result in Norman is particularly
interesting when contrasted with Burson v. Freeman.256 In Norman,
the Court reasoned that the Illinois Supreme Court's construction of
state law would unduly burden any political party lacking the
resources to run a statewide campaign.257 In Burson, the plurality
upheld Tennessee's campaign-free zone, a law that the dissent in
Burson noted would have a grave impact on candidates with fewer
resources, candidates for lower visibility offices, and "grassroots"
candidates.258 The plurality in Burson refused to require that
Tennessee further its interests in protecting voters from intimidation
and fraud by less restrictive means.259 The Court in Norman,
however, mandated that Illinois achieve its interest in ways that
would have the least impact on the First Amendment rights of
political organizers.26 In a time when citizens seem particularly
troubled by the political system, it is unfortunate that the Court has
been inconsistent in its protection of the First Amendment freedoms
of those who seek to participate in the political process.
253 Id.
2M/ d.
2" Id. at 711.
2' 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), discussed infra pp. 40-46.
Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 706.
Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1864 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259 Id.
' See Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 707-08.
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2. Burson v. Freeman
Burson v. Freeman261 was the second case in which the
Supreme Court considered election laws arguably infringing on
speech. In Burson, the Court upheld Section 2-7-111(b) of the
Tennessee Code, which prohibits the solicitation of votes and the
display or distribution of campaign posters, signs, or other materials,
within 100 feet of any polling place.262 Applying strict scrutiny, the
Tennessee Supreme Court struck down the provision on the grounds
that although the State had a compelling interest in banning the
solicitation and distribution of campaign materials inside the polling
place, it had no compelling interest in regulating the premises outside
the polling place. 26" As a result, the state court ruled that the means
chosen to protect the State's interest were neither narrowly tailored
nor the least restrictive means available.
By a five to three vote, the Supreme Court reversed the
Tennessee court and upheld the statute. 2" A plurality opinion,
written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Kennedy, applied strict scrutiny and found
that although the Tennessee statute was a content-based restriction on
political speech in a public forum, the regulation was necessary to
achieve "obviously" compelling interests asserted by the State. 26
Faced with reconciling two First Amendment-related values, the right
to vote and the right to engage in political speech, the plurality
concluded that regulation of the premises inside and outside the
261 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
2 Id. at 1848. Specifically, § 2-7-111(b) states:
Within the appropriate boundary as established in subsection (a) [100
feet from the entrances], and the building in which the polling place
is located, the display of campaign posters, signs or other campaign
materials, distribution of campaign materials, and solicitation of
votes for or against any person or political party or position on a
question are prohibited.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111(b) (Supp. 1991).
Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1847.
x Justice Thomas took no part in the opinion. Id. at 1858.
2 Id. at 1851.
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polling place was necessary to preserve the right of citizens to vote
freely in an election conducted with integrity and reliability. 2" The
plurality pointed to the history of election reform and the need to
combat bribery and intimidation as demonstrating the necessity of
restricted areas around polling places.267 According to the plurality,
the fact that all, fifty states limit access to areas in or around polling
places confirmed the necessity for some restricted zone to prevent
voter intimidation and fraud.268
The plurality rejected the contention that Tennessee could
achieve the same result with laws making it a misdemeanor to
interfere with an election or to use violence or intimidation to prevent
voting. 269 Such laws, the plurality stated, fall short because they
"deal with only the most blatantand specific attempts" to interfere
with elections. 270 Furthermore, because law enforcement officers are
barred from the vicinity of the polling place in order to avoid any
appearance of coercion in the political process, isome such attempts
at interference would go unnoticed. 27 1 As a result, the plurality
explained, the failure of the Tennessee legislature to attempt to
further the States' interests in these ways did not render the statute
fatally overinclusive.272
The plurality also rejected the argument that because the
statute failed to prohibit other types of speech, such as charitable and
commercial solicitation, it was underinclusive and'should be struck
down. 27 3 Noting that states enact laws to address problems they are
faced with, the plurality maintained that there was no evidence that
political candidates use either charitable or commercial speech as a
means of engaging in electoral abuses. 4  In the absence of such
evidence, "[t]he First Amendment does not require States to regulate
2 Id. at 1852, 1858.
17 Id. at 1852, 1853.
m Id. at 1855.
29 Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1855.
"o Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (existence of bribery statute
does not curb necessity for limits on contributions to political campaigns)).
271 Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1855.
2Id.
27I d.
27 Id. at 1856.
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for problems that do not exist. , 75
Acknowledging that the real issue involved in ascertaining the
constitutionality of the law was how large a restricted zone would be
permissible or sufficiently tailored, the plurality addressed whether
the statute was sufficiently narrowly drawn to promote the State's
compelling interest in guarding the right to vote.276 The plurality
cited Munro v. Socialist Workers Pary2" to support the proposition
that when the government has a compelling interest in securing the
right to vote freely and effectively, proof that a given regulation is
perfectly tailored to achieve the asserted State's interest is not
required.278 Instead, the plurality suggested, states should be allowed
to remedy potential problems in the electoral process "provided that
the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on
constitutionally protected rights. "279  Stating that the size of the
boundary is a difference in degree, not a less restrictive alternative
in kind, the plurality concluded that the "minor" geographic limitation
dictated by the law did not constitute a significant impingement.28
At some point, the plurality conceded, restrictions on
campaign activity that takes place "at some measurable distance from
the polls" would be unconstitutionally cumbersome and would be
struck down.281 The plurality refused to articulate a specific test that
would clearly delineate the line between constitutional and
unconstitutional election law restrictions, however, sufficing it to say
that Tennessee was on the constitutional side of the line in
establishing a 100-foot boundary.28 2
Justice Kennedy joined the plurality opinion, and also wrote
a concurring opinion in which he reiterated his concern expressed in
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
275 Id.
2 Id.
7n 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (upholding statute burdening minority party candidates' First
Amendment rights based on state's interest in restricting access to general ballot).
2' Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing Munro, 479 U.S. at 195).
2" Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1857 (quoting Munro, 479 U.S. at 195-96).
o Burson, 112 5. Ct. at 1857 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976)).
m' Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1857.
n2 Id.
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Victims Bd.283 that the "accidental" adoption by the Court of the
compelling state interest test may encourage state attempts to suppress
speech on the basis of its content.2 When courts are faced with
possible content-based distinctions not obvious from the face of the
statute, however, Justice Kennedy explained that the compelling
interest test may be helpful in sorting out which are content-based
regulations and which are not.285 In such cases, the government has
an opportunity to offer a justification for restricting speech unrelated
to the suppression of speech. 2"6 According to Justice Kennedy, the
compelling interest test is useful in determining whether the asserted
state interest was truly unrelated to the suppression of legitimate
speech.28 7 Justice Kennedy maintained that the plurality in Burson
properly used the compelling interest test for such a purpose. 28 The
restriction the Tennessee statute imposed on speech was justified,
according to Justice Kennedy, because it safeguards another
constitutional right, the right to vote. 2 9 As a result, Justice Kennedy
reasoned, the restriction did not pose a threat to core First
Amendment values. 2"
Justice Scalia, although agreeing with the plurality that the
Tennessee regulation was constitutional, authored a separate
concurrence in which he disagreed with the plurality concerning its
characterization of the street and sidewalks around polling places as
a traditional public forum.2 ' Although acknowledging the regulation
was content-based, Justice Scalia viewed the law as a reasonable
viewpoint-neutral regulation of a non-public forum and therefore
constitutional. 21 According to Justice Scalia, the widespread and
historic presence of statutes regulating activities in and around polling
places negates the contention that these areas, including even the
3 112 S. Ct. 501, 512 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1858 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
SId.
Id. at 1859 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
W Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1859.
SId.
2Id.
290 Id.
" Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
m Id.
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public streets and sidewalks near them, are "traditional public
forums."293  Since the plurality found that the law survived strict
scrutiny, Justice Scalia found it to be at least reasonable and therefore
constitutional.2"
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in Burson, joined
by Justices O'Connor and Souter. 295 The dissent agreed with the
plurality that strict scrutiny was appropriate given that the statute was
a content based prohibition on political expression.296 However, the
dissent disputed the plurality's conclusion that the statute was
narrowly tailored or necessary to achieve the State's compelling
interest in orderly access to the polls, pointing out that many states
had much smaller anti-electioneering zones and that Tennessee's
restricted an area of at least 30,000 feet around each polling place. 297
Moreover, the dissent concluded the statute was not narrowly tailored
because it prohibited activity that would not necessarily constrain
voting, such as the display of bumper stickers on cars and campaign
buttons people might wear.29
The dissent maintained that the plurality's reliance on tradition
and historical necessity was "deeply flawed. 2"' Indeed, as the
dissent pointed out, the Supreme Court had previously ruled
unconstitutional both poll taxes and residency requirements with
respect to voting, despite longstanding traditions in favor of such
practices. 3" Although the plurality exempted Tennessee from
Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1859 (Scalia, I., concurring).
Id. at 1860-61. Not one Justice agreed with Justice Scalia's opinion, which would
have substantially altered basic First Amendment principles and effectively allowed the
government to define even a traditional public forum out of existence by pervasively and
comprehensively regulating and restricting it.
295 Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1861 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2%Id.
2 Id. As the dissent remarked, "[e]ven under the most sanguine scenario of
participatory democracy, it is difficult to imagine voter turnout so complete as to require
the clearing of hundreds of thousands of square feet simply to ensure that the path to the
polling-place remains open .... Id.
2 Id. at 1862.
WId.
I00 d. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating Tennessee's one
year residency requirement); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684
(1966) (declaring Virginia poll tax unconstitutional). The plurality in Burson argued that
the cases cited by the dissent were distinguishable because there was no "rational
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producing factual findings as to the present need for such a
restriction, the dissent pointed to numerous examples of courts that
have made such findings and have, without exception, found similarly
broad campaign-free zones to be unwarranted. °1
The dissent in Burson further explained that the statute
selectively discriminated against certain kinds of campaign speech
which could not be justified by reference to the asserted State interest
in protecting orderly access to the polls. 3" When, as is the case
here, the asserted State interest is unrelated to the State's content
based distinctions between types of speech, the dissent maintained,
the Court should reject the asserted state interest.30 3
Finally, the dissent questioned the plurality's assertion that it
properly applied strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of
the Tennessee statute. 3" First, the dissent pointed to the plurality's
substitution of tradition for necessity in its analysis." 5 Second, the
dissent contended the extension of the holding in Munro was
misplaced given the assumption made by the plurality that campaign
free zones do "not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected
connection" between the declared interest and the rules declared unconstitutional.
Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1856 n.10 (quoting Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 ("voter qualifications
have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other tax")).
30' Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1863-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Florida
Comm. for Liability Reform v. McMillan, 628 F. Supp. 1536, 1541-42 (M.D. Fla.
1988) (court granted injunction to organization seeking to enjoin enforcement of statute
prohibiting solicitation within 150 feet of polling place); Clean-Up '84 v. Heinrich, 582
F. Supp. 1511 (11th Cir. 1985) (court enjoined enforcement of statute prohibiting any
person from soliciting or attempting to solicit signatures on any petition within 100 yards
of polling place on election day).
m Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1863-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For example, the dissent
pointed out that § 2-7-111(b) does not prohibit exit polling, arguably an activity with
great potential to interfere with orderly access to the polls. In addition, the regulation
inherently penalizes certain specific types of candidates. Candidates who have fewer
resources and those campaigning for lower visibility offices benefit substantially from
last-minute campaigning near the polling place. Id. at 1864. The dissent maintained that
the plurality failed to inquire whether or not such discrimination was related to any
purported state interest. Id.
' Id. at 1865 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 510 (1991)).
30 Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1865 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30 Id.
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rights." 0 6 Third, the dissent argued that in upholding the statute
because "there is simply no evidence that commercial or charitable
solicitation outside the polling place poses the same potential dangers
as campaigning outside the polling place," the plurality shifted the
burden of proving the necessity of discrimination from the State to
the plaintiff.3"7 The dissent explained that this contradicted the
fundamental principle of strict scrutiny; that the burden of providing
a justification for content discrimination is on the State. 08
Analysis of the conflicting opinions in Burson indicates that
the dissent, along with the Tennessee Supreme Court, had the better
of the argument. The plurality's relatively lax approach to strict
scrutiny conflicts with established Court precedent, including even
decisions this term in Norman v. Reed3o° and R.A. V. v. City of St.
Paul. °10 Perhaps most telling is the criticism that the plurality failed
to explain how to draw the line between election day restrictions that
are constitutional and those that are not. As the dissent pointed out,
there is an important difference between the restricted zone statute the
plurality upheld in Burson and the complete ban on election-day
editorial endorsements the Court struck down as unconstitutional in
Mills. 31 1 Yet, if a 100-foot political speech-free zone is permissible
in Burson, why not a 200, 300, or 1000-foot zone? The plurality
offered no principled basis to distinguish, strongly suggesting the
weakness of the underlying analysis. Given the core First
Amendment values at issue in Burson, it is unfortunate that the
plurality neglected to outline a framework for determining when
states have crossed the line into impermissible regulation of political
speech.
3 Id. (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1986)).
o Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
SId.
30 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992). See discussion supra pp. 35-39.
310 See discussion supra pp. 10-20.
3 1 Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1866 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)).
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3. Burdick v. Takushi
The third case this term in which the Supreme Court
considered an arguably unconstitutional election law is Burdick v.
Takushi.3 12 In Burdick, the Court upheld Hawaii's prohibition on
write-in voting. 13 Alan Burdick was a registered voter in Hawaii
who wished to vote in the primary and general elections for a person
whose name was not on the ballot. 14 Upon learning that Hawaii law
prohibited write-in voting, Burdick filed suit, claiming that the ban
violated his rights of expression and association under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.31" The district court ultimately granted
Burdick's motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief.316 The
Court of Appeals reversed,31 7 holding that in the context of Hawaii's
comprehensive election scheme, the ban on write-in votes did not
unconstitutionally burden the right to vote.318
By a six to three majority, the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.31 9 Justice White wrote the
majority opinion, holding that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting did not
unconstitutionally infringe on voters' First Amendment rights.320
Although acknowledging the significance of the right to vote, 32 1 the
majority stated that the right to vote and the right to associate for
political purposes through the ballot are subject to "reasonable
312 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
3Id. at 2067-68.
314 Id. at 2061.
31 id.
316 Burdick v. Takushi, 737 F. Supp. 582 (Haw. 1990), rev'd, 937 F.2d 415 (9th
Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
317 Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
318 Burdick, 937 F.2d. at 422.
319 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2061.
320 Id. at 2067-68.
321 Id. at 2067. See Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173, 184 (1979) (holding that Illinois election code requiring independent candidates and
new parties to obtain more than 25,000 signatures violated Equal Protection Clause).
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nondiscriminatory restrictions." '322 The majority explained that in
order to preserve the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of elections,
the government must remain free to structure and regulate the
democratic process." Therefore, to subject all election laws to strict
scrutiny, the majority reasoned, would substantially impede
government efforts to protect the electoral process." The majority
stated that in assessing the constitutionality of a challenged regulation,
a court must balance
'the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to
the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate'
against 'the precise interests put forward by the State
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,'
taking into consideration 'the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs
rights. '325
An election law that severely restricts voters' rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, the majority held, must be "narrowly
drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. '3 26
However, an election law that imposes only "reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions" upon citizens' First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, the majority concluded, must be justified with
reference to the State's "important regulatory interests. 3 27
'22 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063-64. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S.
189, 193 (1986) (holding that Illinois ballot access law did not unconstitutionally burden
minority party candidates' rights); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)
(holding that Ohio's early filing deadline for independent candidates unconstitutionally
burdened First Amendment rights of independent candidates).
.. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)
(upholding provision of California Election Code, forbidding ballot position to
independent candidates).
324 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)
(holding that Texas primary election filing fee system violated Equal Protection Clause).
32 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
26 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 705
(1992) (upholding Illinois ballot access scheme)).
32' Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063-64 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
788 (1983)).
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The majority in Burdick characterized the case as a ballot
access case. 2 Since Hawaii's ballot access scheme provided ample
access to interested candidates, the majority determined that the ban
on write-in voting did not severely restrict the First Amendment
rights of voters to associate and have their candidate of choice placed
on the ballot. 29 The slight burden Hawaii's ballot access system did
impose on voters' freedom of choice and association, the majority
maintained, was borne primarily by those citizens choosing their
candidates shortly before the primary, an interest the majority noted
was customarily accorded little weight.3
The majority inBurdick rejected claims that Hawaii's write-in
prohibition conditioned voters' participation upon the waiver of their
First Amendment right to remain free from advocating viewpoints
they did not support.3 The purpose of the election process, the
majority stated, was "'to winnow out and finally reject all but the
chosen candidates,"' not to furnish a forum for venting "'short-range
political goals, pique, or personal quarrel[s]."'332 The majority in
Burdick also rejected claims that the law discriminated against citizens
wishing to express a particular message through their vote,
concluding that Hawaii's absolute ban on write-in votes was content
neutral.333
In Burdick, the majority found that Hawaii's interest in
"avoiding the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general
election" justified the ban on write-in voting.334 The write-in ban, the
majority concluded, preserved the general election for major
contested races and avoided "divisive sore loser candidacies. "M The
majority also found that Hawaii had a legitimate interest in preventing
328 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2065-66;
2 Id. at 2066.
o Id. at 2068 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974)). The cutoff date
for filing nominating petitions in Hawaii was two months before the primary. HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 12-2.5 to 12-7 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
33' Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066.
332 Id. (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 735).
3 33 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S.
189, 196 (1986)).
334 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 735; Munro, 479 U.S. at
196, 199.
131 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066.
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"party raiding."336 The majority pointed out that Hawaii law required
party candidates to be "members [ ] of the party" '337 and also
prohibited candidates from filing "nomination papers both as a party
candidate and as a non-partisan candidate."338 Absent the write-in
ban, the majority explained that Hawaii's election laws could easily
be frustrated at the primary by citizens launching a write-in campaign
for a person who had not filed in time or who had never intended to
run for election.339 Hawaii had a legitimate interest in preventing
these electoral abuses, the majority concluded, and Hawaii's
prohibition on write-in voting was a legitimate way of advancing its
interests.
Not only did the majority uphold Hawaii's ban on write-in
voting, it also adopted a presumption that a state's prohibition on
write-in voting would be valid if its ballot access laws imposed only
reasonable burdens on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 4
The majority reasoned that in such cases, any burden on voter's free
choice would be minimal, and would be offset by the States' interests
supporting the ballot access scheme. 41 In such instances, the
majority maintained, objections to write-in bans were merely demands
that the state record individual protests to the choices presented on
the ballot.342  The majority in Burdick declined to attribute such a
generalized expressive function to the ballot, stating that to do so
would jeopardize states' ability to conduct elections fairly and
31 Id. (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 219 (1986))
(holding that Connecticut closed primary law impermissibly interfered with political
party's First Amendment right to define associationalboundaries). The majority defined
"party raiding" as "the organized switching of blocs of voters from one party to another
in order to manipulate the outcome of the other party's primary election." Burdick, 112
S. Ct. at 2066 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 n.9 (1983)).
" HAW. REV. STAT. § 12-3(a)(7) (1985).
Im Id. § 12-3(c).
339 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2067. The majority also stated that the write-in ban was
essential to prohibit mounting a campaign at the general election for a person who had
lost in the primary or for an independent who had failed to get an adequate number of
votes to make the general election ballot. Id.
340 Id.
341 Id.
342 Id.
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efficiently.
Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented from the
majority opinion in Burdick, disagreeing with the majority's
conclusion that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting did not impose a
significant burden on citizens' First Amendment right to vote for the
candidates of their choice. 3" Justice Kennedy, writing for the
dissent, agreed with the majority's statement of the test to apply to
determine the severity with which a state election law burdens the
right to vote.3 45 However, the dissent pointed to the large number of
blank ballots cast in uncontested races as evidence that Hawaii's
prohibition on write-in voting prevented voters from casting
meaningful votes. 3" The dissent noted that Hawaii's write-in
prohibition created an extremely difficult situation for voters who
learn disturbing information about their preferred candidates late in
an election.3 47 In addition, Hawaii's ballot access scheme, the dissent
pointed out, magnified the injury to voters' First Amendment rights
by creating impediments to third and independent party candidates
wishing to appear on the ballot.3 4 Based on these factors, the dissent
reasoned that Hawaii's write-in ban deprived some voters of any
substantial voice in selecting candidates for the entire range of offices
at issue in a particular election. 149
The dissent in Burdick concluded that Hawaii had failed to
3 id.
3 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2068 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 2069.
Id. at 2072.
7 Id. at 2068.
" Id. The dissent explained that small parties may have difficulty organizing early
enough to meet Hawaii's deadline for gathering nominating signatures. Furthermore,
Hawaii law provided that each voter may choose only a single ballot for all offices.
Because there are not often independent candidates for all offices, the dissent argued, a
voter wishing to vote for an independent candidate might forgo the opportunity to vote
for several offices. Id. at 2068-69.
' Id. at 2068. The dissent in Burdick rejected the majority's presumption
concerning the permissibility of a state's write-in prohibition. Instead, the dissent argued
that courts must regard the existence or non-existence of write-in bans as a consideration
in determining the constitutionality of a state's ballot access scheme. The majority's
reasoning, the dissent maintained, was circular, and excused the state from having to
adequately justify its write-in ban. Id. at 2071.
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justify the prohibition on write-in voting under any level of
scrutiny.3 5' The State, the dissent noted, had an interest in preserving
the integrity of party primaries by preventing sore loser candidacies
during the general election."' However, the dissent maintained that
the write-in ban was an overinclusive means of addressing the
problem.3 52  The ban on write-in votes, the dissent pointed out,
prohibited legitimate candidacies as well as undesirable ones. 53 In
addition, because the State's interest in preventing party raiding arose
out of its chosen open primary system, the dissent asserted it should
not serve to justify the write-in ban at primary elections."' 4
Furthermore, the asserted State interest in advancing its policy of
allowing unopposed victors in some primaries to obtain office without
having to participate in the general election, the dissent argued,
created an enhanced need for write-in voting at the primary.3 5
Finally, the State's asserted need to foster an informed electorate was
undermined, the dissent pointed out, by the fact that voters who write
in candidates are likely to be the most informed and politically active
citizens in the electorate.356
The Court's decision in Burdick neglects the realities that
small parties and independent candidates face in achieving access to
the ballot. The Court has previously used the Equal Protection
Clause to invalidate state statutes that disproportionately affect
independent candidates and small parties. 357 A similar rationale could
have applied in Burdick. In addition, the Court's adoption of a
presumption regarding prohibitions on write-in voting, as the dissent
pointed out, enables courts to ignore an essential element in their
calculation of whether or not a state's ballot access scheme imposes
unreasonable restrictions on voter's First Amendment rights.
3'o Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2071 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
351 Id.
352 Id.
35 Id.
"5 Id. at 2071-72.
3S Id. at 2071.
3m Id. at 2072.
"1 See Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187
(1979); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
34 (1968).
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Although the Court noted that it was not endorsing write-in bans,35
states that do implement them are now more able to do so without
adequate justification.
II. Freedom of Association -- Dawson v. Delaware
The Supreme Court considered one case this term concerning
the First Amendment freedom of association. Dawson v. Delaware 35 9
concerned the question whether the admission of evidence against a
criminal defendant concerning his membership in a gang violated his
freedom of association."6 At the penalty hearing of Davis Dawson,
who was convicted of first degree murder, the prosecution read the
following stipulation to the jury: "The Aryan Brotherhood refers to
a white racist prison gang that began ... in California in response
to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves
the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many other state prisons
including Delaware."361 The prosecution also introduced evidence
that Dawson had the words "Aryan Brotherhood" tattooed on his
hand.362 Based in part on this evidence, the jury made a binding
recommendation that Dawson be sentenced to death. On appeal, the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the death
penalty sentence. 63
By an eight to one majority, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment below and remanded the case in order to decide whether the
wrongful admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was harmless
error.3" Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that
it was constitutional error for the trial court to have admitted
3 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2067 n.l1.
... 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
Id. at 1095.
3' Id. at 1096 (quoting trial app. at 132).
2 Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 1096.
Dawson v. Delaware, 581 A.2d 1078, 1109 (Del. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1093
(1992).
m Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1099. See Clemens v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750
(1990) (upholding federal constitutional authority of state appellate court to affirm death
sentence based in part on aggravating circumstances by harmless-error rule).
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evidence of Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood. 65 In
reaching its conclusion, the majority rejected Dawson's broad
assertion that the First Amendment erected a per se barrier to the
admissibility concerning one's beliefs and associations at a capital
sentencing hearing.3 Nevertheless, the Court agreed that the
admission of the evidence in this case violated the First
Amendment.367
Noting that the stipulation lacked specificity about the
Delaware "chapter" of the Aryan Brotherhood, the majority reasoned
that the jury was left to infer that the beliefs of the Delaware chapter
were identical to the beliefs of the California chapter.368
Additionally, the majority explained that even if the Delaware group
to which Dawson allegedly belonged was racist, those beliefs were
unrelated to the facts of Dawson's case.369 Since Dawson's victim
was white, the majority asserted, there were no elements of racial
hatred involved in the killing. 37" Therefore, the majority concluded,
the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was in no way relevant to Dawson's
sentencing proceeding.371
The Court pointed out that the prosecution in Dawson failed
to prove that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed or endorsed any
unlawful or violent acts. 72 If the prosecution had offered such proof,
the majority suggested, Dawson's membership in the Aryan
Brotherhood might have been relevant to show he was a future
danger to society.373 The majority concluded that absent proof of the
specific unlawful acts committed by the Aryan Brotherhood, the jury
was left with nothing more than evidence concerning the abstract
3 Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1096.
36 Id. at 1097. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (upholding admission
of evidence of defense witness' membership in organization).
I Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1097.
3N Id. at 1098.
3Id.
370 Id.
"' Id. The majority distinguished the evidence presented in Dawson from the
evidence in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), in which evidence of the
defendant's membership in the Black Liberation Army was related to the murder of a
white hitchhiker. See Barclay, 463 U.S. at 942-44.
37 Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1098.
$73 Id.
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beliefs of Dawson or the Delaware chapter. 74 Regardless of whether
the proof was characterized as evidence of Dawson's character,
rebuttal of Dawson's evidence concerning his character, or in some
other manner, the Court ruled that "Dawson's First Amendment
rights were violated by the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood
evidence in this case, because the evidence proved nothing more than
Dawson's abstract beliefs.""'
Justice Blackmun wrote a brief concurring opinion in Dawson,
maintaining that the Court's decision did not mandate the application
of the harmless-error review on remand. 76 Justice Blackmun pointed
to numerous cases in which the Court had declined to apply the
harmless-error test to constitutional errors.377 In Dawson, Justice
Blackmun argued, "because of the potential chilling effect that
consideration of First Amendment activity at sentencing might have,
there is substantial argument that harmless-error analysis is not
appropriate for the type of error before us today. 3 7s
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in Dawson in
which he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the Aryan
Brotherhood evidence had "no relevance" to the issues being decided
at the sentencing proceeding. 9  Justice Thomas argued that under
Delaware law, evidence of Dawson's gang membership was relevant
character evidence in determining whether he should receive the death
7 Id.
"' Id. (explaining that "the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable") (quoting Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
376 Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1099 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
377 Id. at 1099-1100. See, e.g., Batsonv. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (Equal
Protection Clause forbids prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account
of their race or on assumption that black jurors will be unable to impartially consider
state's case against black defendant); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1986)
(finding it is a denial of equal protection to exclude blacks from a grand jury that
indicted black defendant); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1984) (closure of
entire suppression hearing plainly unjustified and violated defendant's 6th Amendment
public trial guarantee); Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (denial of 14th
Amendment Due Process to subject liberty and property of defendant to judgment of trial
judge who has direct interest in reaching conclusion against him).
37 Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1100 (Blackmun, I., concurring).
3 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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penalty.3"' This evidence could be used to rebut evidence that
Dawson had presented regarding his good character and could be
used to demonstrate his possible future danger to society."' He also
asserted that the majority's ruling improperly made it difficult for
prosecutors, but not defendants, to introduce character evidence, and
that the majority failed to explain why the courts may consider
evidence of some First Amendment protected activities and not
others.32
The Supreme Court in Dawson left open the admissibility of
some evidence in criminal penalty proceedings concerning an
individual's beliefs and associations. As the dissent pointed out,
however, the Court failed to provide clear guidelines as to when such
evidence is relevant. The Court clearly held that the Aryan
Brotherhood evidence in Dawson lacked any relevance to the
sentencing proceeding. However, particularly given the dearth of
evidence presented and the lack of connection between the evidence
of Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood and the crime,
Dawson fails to provide clear guidance as to when evidence of
activities protected under the First Amendment is admissible in a
criminal case.
III. The Establishment Clause -- Lee v. Weisman
The sole Establishment Clause case rendered this term was
Lee v. Weisman. 3 In Weisman, a closely divided Supreme Court
ruled that the Establishment Clause forbids officially sanctioned
prayer at public school graduation ceremonies.'" For Deborah
Weisman's middle school graduation, the principal, following
Providence, Rhode Island's School Committee policy, invited a rabbi
Id. Delaware law states that after a judge or jury finds a statutory aggravating
factor, it must consider "all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation" relating to
either the crime or the "character and propensities" of the defendant. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)(a-b) (1987).
3' Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1102, 1104 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
m Id at 1102.
112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
I d. at 2661.
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to deliver prayers at the ceremony."5 Prior to the ceremony the
principal provided the rabbi with guidelines regarding prayers at civic
occasions and advised the rabbi that the invocation and benediction
should be non-sectarian."' The rabbi accepted the invitation and
delivered the prayers." 7 Weisman's father sought an injunction
barring Providence public school officials from inviting members of
the clergy to give similar invocations and benedictions at future
graduation ceremonies."' The District Court granted Weisman's
injunction and held that under the three-part test outlined in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,' 9 the practice violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment." 9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's ruling. 9
The Supreme Court, by a five to four majority, affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals declaring the school system's
policy unconstitutional.". Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, wrote the opinion of the
Court holding that the State's practice conflicted with well-established
principles governing prayer in primary and secondary schools.393
Accordingly, Justice Kennedy wrote, the majority declined the
"invitation" by the Bush Justice Department and the petitioners to
reconsider the general constitutional guidelines set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman regulating the degree of allowable government
Id. at 2652.
Id. The guidelines were originally drafted by the National Conference of
Christians and Jews. Id.
M7 id.
Id. at 2654. -
m9 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35 Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (lst Cir.
1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). The three-part Establishment Clause test set forth
in Lemon v. Kurtzman mandates that for a state practice to satisfy the Establishment
Clause the practice must (1) reflect a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; (3) not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The District Court determined
that Providence's practice violated the second prong of the Lemon test. Weisman, 728
F. Supp. at 71.
Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), af'd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
s Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2649.
-m Id.
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accommodation of religious practices.3" Given the direct
involvement of the State in the planning of the prayer and the
effectively obligatory nature of the ceremony, the Court concluded
that the school's practice violated fundamental Establishment Clause
principles.395 Since the principal in Weisman decided a prayer would
be given, chose and invited the rabbi, and guided and advised the
rabbi on the content and the nature of the prayer, Justice Kennedy
explained, the school's involvement in the religious activity was
"pervasive," and created an unconstitutional state sponsored religious
activity in school.396
Prayer in schools, the majority reasoned, is particularly
troubling given the high risk of subtle coercion of school age
children.397 The public pressure and peer pressure created by public
school officials' control of graduation ceremonies and the
susceptibility of adolescents to conform, Justice Kennedy maintained,
combined to create an unacceptable risk that dissenting students were
pressured to participate in the exercise or at a minimum perceived the
3 Id. at 2655.
39 Id.
I Id. The majority stated that "at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise,
or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a state religion or religious faith or tends
to do so.'" (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (holding that city's
inclusion of nativity scene in its Christmas display did not violate Establishment
Clause)). See also Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591
(1989) (holding that creche in county courthouse violated Establishment Clause although
Chanukah menorah and Christmas tree outside city and county building did not
unconstitutionally endorse Christian and Jewish faiths); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (holding New Jersey statute providing for the transportation of
pupils to public and parochial schools constitutional).
19 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2649. See Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261-62 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (upholding as
constitutional Equal Access Act requiring schools to give the same access to student
religious groups as non-religious groups); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584
(1987) (holding that Louisiana statute requiring the teaching of Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science lacked secular purpose and violated Establishment Clause); Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (holding
that statutes authorizing readings from Bible at opening of school exercises violated
Establishment Clause).
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State's position as one enforcing a particular religion. 9  The
majority distinguished Weisman from Marsh v. Chambers,3 which
upheld public prayer at the opening of a state legislative session,
noting that Marsh involved a situation in which "adults are free to
enter and leave . . . .
The majority in Weisman rejected the contention that the
option of students not to attend the graduation ceremony obviated any
Establishment Clause problem.411  "Law reaches past formalism,"
Justice Kennedy stated, and "to say a teenage student has a real
choice not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the
extreme. ",402 The First Amendment, the majority noted, guarantees
that citizens not be forced to forfeit rights as the price of resisting
compliance with state-sponsored religious practice.40 3 "[T]he fact that
attendance at the graduation ceremonies is voluntary in a legal sense,"
the majority concluded, "does not save the religious exercise. "'
Justice Kennedy was careful to note that the holding in
Weisman was limited to the circumstances of the case.405 Attempts
to eradicate religion from all aspects of public life, he explained,
might well be inconsistent with the Constitution.' In fact, Justice
Kennedy suggested that there would be instances in which religion
could properly be involved in public schools and at graduation
' Weisman, 112 S. Ct, at 2658. The Court noted, for example, that standing in
respectful silence carries with it the unacceptable risk that the dissenter will be
misperceived as having participated in the prayer and therefore is an inadequate means
of expressing his or her objections. Id.
"9 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
" Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
401 Id. at 2559.
4M Id.
4 Id. at 2660.
' Id. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (holding that regardless of
parents' ability to excuse their children from daily required prayer in school, practice
violated Establishment Clause). The majority further noted, based on Engel and other
cases, that the non-sectarian nature of the prayer mitigated neither the violation of
dissenters' rights nor the violation of the First Amendment prohibition against schools
engaging in the establishment of religion. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
Id. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
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ceremonies.4 °7 However, the majority held that an explicitly religious
exercise may not be conducted at a public school graduation
ceremony where "young graduates who, object are induced to
conform" and the school seeks to "persuade or compel a student to
participate. ,408
Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion in Weisman
which Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined.' Although agreeing
with the Court's holding and Justice Kennedy's opinion, Justice
Blackmun went further to maintain specifically, in contrast to the
position taken by the Bush Justice Department and the dissent, that
evidence of government coercion was not necessary to prove an
Establishment Clause violation. 4"0  Because even subtle pressure
reduces the ability of individuals to choose their beliefs, Justice
Blackmun explained, true freedom of religion entails more than
freedom from coercion.411 The fact that the Providence school
system engaged in and endorsed religious activity, Justice Blackmun
stated, was sufficient to prove the practice unconstitutional.412 The
risk of excluding some individuals, the need to protect democracy,
and the need for religious freedom, Justice Blackmun reasoned,
mandate a prohibition against government endorsement, sponsorship,
and involvement in religion, in accordance with prior precedent.4 3
Justice Souter, also joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor,
authored another concurring opinion in Weisman, in which he
reaffirmed the principle that the Establishment Clause prohibits
4o Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661. Specifically, Justice Kennedy referred to Westside
Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), which upheld
extracurricular religious meetings at public schools.
40C Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661.
4 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
410 Id. at 2664. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (Alabama statute authorizing daily periods of silence in public schools lacked
secular purpose and violated Establishment Clause); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973) (holding that New York statute authorizing aid to
non-public schools and income tax benefits to parents of children attending non-public
schools violated Establishment Clause).
4 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2665 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
412 Id. at 2664.
413 Id. at 2666-67. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 342 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)
(upholding New York City statute providing for the release of public school pupils from
school attendance to attend religious classes).
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practices that favor religion over non-religion even where no specific
sectarian beliefs or practices are preferred. 14 The Supreme Court
has consistently held that the Establishment Clause forbids practices
that favor religion generally, 1 5 and Justice Souter maintained, that
absent a compelling reason the Court should not abandon such
precedent. 16 Justice Souter pointed to the history of the textual
development of the Establishment Clause as additional evidence
supporting the conclusion that it prohibits state support of religion in
general.41 7  In addition, Justice Souter suggested, allowing
governmental favoritism of religion generally would inappropriately
require courts to engage in comparisons of religious practices to
determine which were sufficiently non-sectarian to be
constitutional. 8
Justice Souter also reiterated Justice Blackmun's criticism of
the "coercion" theory of the Establishment Clause. 9 Justice Souter
pointed to several cases in which the Court had invalidated State laws
and practices endorsing religion where no coercion was involved, 2
and explained that an examination of constitutional history simply did
not reveal the kind of, inconsistency with settled law to warrant a
reconsideration of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 21
In addition, Justice Souter observed that since the Free Exercise
Clause already prohibits coercion to participate in religious activity,
adopting a coercion test would render the Establishment Clause a
414 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Everson v. Ewing
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
41' Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring). See, e.g., Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989) (holding unconstitutional state tax exemption
benefitting only religious periodicals).
416 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2668 (Souter, J., concurring).
411 Id. at 2670.
411 Id. at 2671.
419 Id.
0 Id. at 2671-72 (citing Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S.
5,73, 589-94, 598-602 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61, 67-84 (1985);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
421 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2676 (Souter, I., concurring).
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duplicate and a "virtual nullity. " 422
Justice Scalia vigorously dissented in Weisman, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas.4" Justice
Scalia argued that the meaning of the Establishment Clause should be
determined by reference to the position of prayer in history.4 ' Since
prayer has traditionally figured prominently in government
ceremonies as well as in public-school graduation ceremonies, Justice
Scalia maintained, the prayer at issue in Weisman did not violate the
Establishment Clause.425
Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
students' attendance and participation at the graduation ceremony
were in effect obligatory, suggesting that students who objected to the
prayer could sit in silence.426 Moreover, according to Justice Scalia,
the government's interest in fostering respect for religion generally
outweighed any individual interest in avoiding the false appearance
of having participated in the prayer.427
Justice Scalia vigorously argued that coercion was necessary
to invalidate a practice under the Establishment Clause, and
questioned the legitimacy of the majority's reliance on "peer-
pressure" or "psychological coercion."428  Instead, Justice Scalia
asserted that the Establishment Clause protects only against coercion
of religious activity or support for religion that was coerced by "force
" Id. at 2673. Justice Souter recognized that the State was free to "accommodate"
the free exercise of religion "by relieving people from generally applicable rules that
interfere with their religious callings." Id. at 2676. However, the accommodation,
Justice Souter noted, must "lift a discernable burden on the free exercise of religion."
Id. at 2677. In Weisman, Justice Souter argued, students could not realistically complain
that the exclusion of prayer from their graduation ceremony "burdened" their free
exercise of religion. Id.
423 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2678 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
424 Id. at 2678-79 (citing Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 657, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
425 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Much of Justice Scalia's
historical analysis was specifically discussed and refuted in Justice Souter's concurring
opinion. See id. at 2667-78 passim (Souter, J., concurring).
4 Id. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
I ld. at 2682. Justice Scalia cited no previous Court precedent for the proposition
that the state has a legitimate government interest in fostering respect for religion that
outweighs the individual interest in religious freedom.
4n Id. at 2683-84.
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of law" or "threat of penalty."429 Since there was no evidence that
students who failed to take part in the invocation or benediction
would be subject to penalty or discipline, and since there was no
mandatory attendance at graduation ceremonies (unlike the classrooms
involved in previous school cases), Justice Scalia argued that the
graduation prayers did not violate the Establishment Clause.43 °
Justice Scalia concluded by suggesting that despite the
majority's explicit refusal to reconsider Lemon v. Kurtzman, the
decision effectively produced the "interment of that case" since the
majority "essentially ignored it. "431 According to Justice Scalia,
however, the Court acted improperly by ruling unconstitutional a
government-endorsed prayer and "the expression of gratitude to God
that a majority of the community wishes to make. "432
Many observers were encouraged, and somewhat surprised,
by the fact that the majority decision in Weisman affirmed the
importance of church-state separation in the public schools, ruled
unconstitutional the practice of official graduation prayer, and
declined to reconsider Lemon.433 In some respects, however,
Weisman may be the beginning, not the end, of serious questions
about the future of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Much of the debate concerning the Establishment Clause has
focused on whether government coercion to participate in religious
practice is necessary to prove a constitutional violation or whether,
as Justice Souter suggested, official government endorsement of
religion violates the First Amendment. Resolution of this debate is
far from academic; it has potentially important implications for
government aid to parochial schools, municipally-sponsored creches
or holiday displays, teaching evolution versus creationism in the
public schools, and many other controversies. Based on Weisman,
the Court appears divided three ways on the issue: four votes for
coercion (the dissenters in Weisman), four votes for endorsement (the
four concurring justices), and Justice Kennedy, squarely in the
42' Id. at 2683.
43 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 2685.
432 Id. at 2686.
13 See, e.g., Justices Decline to Rewrite Church-State Separation Rules, 20 ScH.
LAW NEWs, July 3, 1992, at 1.
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middle.
Justice Kennedy's opinion includes elements of both coercion
and endorsement in its analysis,434 and clearly leaves room for a
different result in a different case, particularly outside of the public
schools. Indeed, Justice Scalia suggested that even graduation
prayers might be acceptable to a majority of the Court if the school
makes clear that no one is "compelled to join in them.",4  Although
this particular suggestion may be wishful thinking, Justice Kennedy
has himself criticized Lemon and endorsed coercion analysis in a
1989 case concerning municipal creches.436 Particularly outside the
public schools, Lemon and the endorsement standard may still be on
very shaky ground, causing great uncertainty for the lower courts and
serious potential problems for the Establishment Clause.
Interestingly, although petitions for certiorari were pending
in several cases at the time of Weisman that could have resolved some
of the uncertainties left after the Court's decision, the Supreme Court
declined to review fully even a single one. These included decisions
on such issues as municipal religious holiday displays, use of
religious symbols on municipal seals, whether a student volunteer
could deliver a voluntary nonsectarian prayer at a graduation, and
whether a judge could open each day's court session with a prayer.4 7
'4 See, e.g., Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 (noting that "at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religious exercise"); id. at 2657 (explaining that "state-sponsored and state-directed
religious exercise in a public school" is improper).
I ld. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
o See Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 665 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4" See Harris v. City of Zion, Ill., 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 3054 (1992) (holding that religious symbols on municipal seals violates
Establishment Clause); Murray v. City of Austin, Tex., 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992) (upholding as constitutional city's inclusion of
Christian cross in municipal insignia); N.C. Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v.
Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992)
(holding that state judge's practice of opening each morning's court session with a prayer
violates Establishment Clause); Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d
109 (2nd Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992) (holding that private group's
display of menorah in a public park violates Establishment Clause, where displayed
prominently and separately from secular exhibit, rather than placed as part of whole
display); Doe v. Village of Crestwood, Ill., 917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992) (holding that municipality's sponsorship of Roman Catholic mass
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Yet four months later, at the beginning of its 1992-1993
Term, the Court agreed to review two additional cases raising church-
state issues in the school setting. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist.431 concerns a school district's refusal to allow
a religious group to use facilities during evening hours to show a
religious film series where similar non-religious uses were
permitted. 439 The issue in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.4
is whether providing a sign language interpreter to a deaf student
under the federal Education of the Handicapped Act would violate the
Establishment Clause where such aid is available to students attending
public and private non-religious schools." 1 These cases, as well as
continuing church-state controversies elsewhere, make clear that the
Court will be addressing Establishment Clause issues again in the
months and years to come.
spoken in Italian as part of Italian festival violates Establishment Clause); Kuhn v. City
of Rolling Meadows, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025
(1992) (holding that religious symbols on municipal seals violates Establishment Clause);
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S.
Ct. 3020 (1992) (upholding as constitutional school policy allowing prayer invoking God
at high school graduation ceremony, provided prayer is non-sectarian and written and
delivered by student volunteer).
43 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1992) (No. 91-2024).
"' Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 383.
440 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1992) (No. 92-94).
44 Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1191.

